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ABSTRACT
Aliabadi, Sara. Ph.D. The University of Memphis. December 2011. Meeting Analysts’
Forecasts through Securitization, and Value Relevance of Securitization: A Global
Perspective. Major Professor: Zabihollah Rezaee, Ph.D.
Based on a sample of 71 companies that follow U.S. GAAP and 41 companies
that follow IFRS for the period between 2005 and 2010, I examine: a) the impact of
different approaches in accounting standards, FASB Statement 140 (control-based) and
IAS 39 (risk-based approach), on earnings management (measured by meeting/beating
analysts’ forecast) using fair-value accounting in securitization transactions; b) the
association between securitization gain and change in the value-relevance of an
accounting performance measure, return on equity (ROE); c) the association between
securitization gain and earnings management after controlling for the components of a
firm’s competitive advantage; d) the joint effect of IFRS and the level of investor
protection on earnings management using securitization transactions.
I use multivariate linear regression and nonlinear Logit models with panel and
cross-sectional data. My contributions to the literature are: a) I shed light on the
controversy about fair-value accounting in relation to securitization; b) in relation to
FASB Statement 140 (FASB ASC 860) and IAS 39, I provide evidence to support the
idea of convergence of accounting standards; c) I show that IFRS is effective under any
level of investor protection. To the best of my knowledge, these issues are not addressed
in prior studies.
For companies following U.S. GAAP, I show evidence of earnings management
for the period 2005-2006 (before the financial crisis of 2007). However, my results show
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that the discount rate is not used for manipulating fair value of retained interest (partial
interest in secured assets), and there is no positive relationship between securitization
gain and competitive advantage for any time period. Also there is no indication of
earnings management for the 2008-2010 periods.
I find that the IFRS regulations associated with securitization are intense and
reduce the extent of earnings management under any level of investor protection.
Furthermore, my findings show that in the first two periods, 2005-2006 and 2008-2009,
companies that operate under strong anti-director laws experience higher securitization
gain. It appears that the securitization market is more efficient in countries where
investors are granted more power to exercise their rights. Lastly, the results do not show
any change in the value-relevance of return on equity.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
I. OVERVIEW
Securitization is a method of financing, but manipulation in securitization
transactions has the potential to affect many stakeholders. In the United States alone, $2
trillion of the debt issued in 2006 were securitized assets (Securitization Market
Activity.png 2010). During 2005 Hong Kong’s securitization activities increased by 84
percent compare to the previous year (Banking Policy Departmen 2005). Furthermore,
the Chinese firms’ use of securitization is also an indication of the popularity of
securitization activities. The fast expansion of financing through securitization shows the
importance of securitization transactions in the world, including in the United States.
Securitization is a popular financing tool that involves several parties. Through
securitization of financial assets, the seller can create cash and transfer the risk of holding
receivables to another party (Dechow et al. 2010). The buyer of receivables finances the
purchase by issuing securities, backed by expected future cash flows of securitized assets,
to a third party. Depending on how management constructs the transaction, securitization
can be accounted for as a sales transaction or it can be recorded as a secured borrowing,
which results in an increase in the company’s leverage. Managers have incentives to
construct the securitization transaction to meet the sale criteria, which does not increase
the leverage, but does create immediate access to cash, improves efficiency ratios, and
increases profits (Dechow and Shakespeare 2009). Accounting standards that govern
securitization transactions, including fair-value accounting, are complex and
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controversial. Skeel (2011) posits that only a small group of Americans was really
familiar with the securitization process until they witnessed their tax money being used to
save large failing banks and financial institutions1. Furthermore, a study by Niu and
Richardson (2006) shows that investors believe that the value-relevance of earnings is
higher when securitization gain is not included in earnings.
Critics have argued that the flexibility and vagueness of the existing fair-value
accounting standards contributed to the recent financial crisis (Wallison 2008a & 2008b;
Whalen 2008; Forbes 2009). Prior studies argue that accounting standards for
securitization under International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) are more rigid
compared to the United States Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (U.S. GAAP)
(Adhikari and Betancourt 2008). Using a sample of 96 U.S. firms, Dechow et al. (2010)
show that managers use fair-value accounting to manage earnings through securitization.
Using a different time period than that of Dechow et al. (2010) and including
companies that follow IFRS, I investigate whether easier criteria for securitization under
U.S. GAAP allow managers to use fair-value accounting to meet/beat analysts’ forecasts,
and whether I can find similar results for companies complying with IFRS for
securitization. My study differs from that of Dechow et al. (2010) in three main aspects.
First, they selected a sample from the period between 2000 and 2005, which is before the
financial crisis of 2007, while I selected a time, 2005-2010, that covers periods both
before and after the financial crisis. Second, my study includes the effect of the new
1

At this point, the public had lost faith in the regulatory system. In order to assure
Americans, the Dodd-Frank Act, the Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, was
signed into law in 2010. This new law is intended to closely regulate companies.
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standard set after 2005 for fair-value accounting2. Third, I investigate the role of
securitization in earnings management, measured by meeting/beating analysts’ forecasts,
under U.S. GAAP and IFRS.
For securitization transactions, U.S. companies before 2010 followed completely
different rules under SFAS 140 (ASC 860)3 than companies that complied with IFRS for
securitization under IAS 39. My study is important because there are continuous efforts
from European and U.S. standard-setters to converge national accounting standards with
a set of globally-accepted high-quality accounting standards. It is important to see how
SFAS 166 has narrowed the gap in accounting standards between U.S. GAAP and IFRS.
In this dissertation, I have three objectives, which are the topics of my three-paper
dissertation. The first objective deals with the opportunistic behavior of managers when
2

In order to reduce the differences between accounting standards set by FASB and ISBA
in regard to financial assets and securitizations activities, FASB, in June of 2009, published
statement no. 166, Accounting for Transfers of Financial Assets, which was a revision to
Statement no. 140, Accounting for Transfers and Servicing of Financial Assets and
Extinguishments of Liabilities. This new standard requires more disclosures on transfer of
financial assets, specifically when firms retain partial interest in the transferred assets, which
consequently exposes the firm to risk. The new regulation has also set new criteria for
derecognizing financial assets. Under this statement, “qualifying special-purpose entity” is
eliminated. The Financial statements prepared from the beginning of 2010 should reflect the
impact of the new standard. The new standard influences my papers as well; therefore, I expand
my data from 2005 to 2010 to show the impact of differences in accounting standards and the
impact of the new standard.
3

SFAS 140, Accounting for Transfers and Servicing of Financial Assets and
Extinguishments of Liabilities, is now FASB ASC 860. FASB’s Accounting Standards
Codification is an online storage of current U.S. GAAP organized based on topics and into two
levels of guidance (authoritative and non-authoritative). FASB ASC 860 is about transfer and
servicing of asset.
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using fair-value accounting in securitization transactions. There are several reasons for
managers to manipulate earnings upward or downward. Their actions could be totally
protective of the company or out of concern for their own interests. Managers are
concerned with the company’s reputation, credit rating, stock value, and investors’
reactions, as well as their own bonuses and compensation. Managers use different
approaches to achieve earnings targets.
In the first paper, I investigate whether managers take advantage of the easier
criteria of SFAS 140 (risk based) compared to IAS 39 (control based) for securitization,
and use fair-value accounting to manage earnings. Considering the changes in accounting
standards and the possibility of convergence, the question is “Would accounting under
IFRS change the opportunistic behaviors of managers?”
Managers also can time the securitization transactions to show higher income at
the end of the period, or they can use a “cherry-picking” approach, which means selling
assets with higher price appreciation to show higher gains. Securitization gain may also
result from a company’s competitive advantage and not earnings management. Therefore,
the second objective that I am addressing relates to a prior study by Barth and Taylor
(2010) that suggests that managers do not need to manage earnings when their companies
have a unique ability to generate more financial assets (i.e., loans) and earn positive
income by selling them. Thus, my second paper investigates whether the source of
securitization gain is a) earnings management or b) competitive advantage.
Countries that permit/require their firms to adopt IFRS are governed by different
legal systems, which are also enforced with various degrees of rigor. Prior studies show
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that accounting standards are more effective in countries with stronger investorprotection laws (e.g., Hung 2001; Leuz et al. 2003). Furthermore, prior studies show that
investors value earnings more when the earnings exclude securitization gain (e.g., Niu
and Richardson 2004). Therefore, my last objectives are to examine the impact of
securitization gain on the value-relevance of an accounting measure for companies that
follow U.S. GAAP, as well as to examine the dual effect of IFRS and investor protection
on earnings management for companies that have adopted IFRS and operate under
different legal systems.
My dissertation provides several contributions. First, my dissertation sheds light
on the controversy about fair-value accounting in relation to securitization. Second, in
relation to SFAS 140 and IAS 39, I provide evidence to support the idea of convergence
of accounting standards with the IFRS. Also, by expanding the observations to the end of
2010, this dissertation provides evidence on the improvement of financial reporting with
regard to securitization as a result of the new SFAS 166 (an amendment to SFAS 140,
FASB ASC 860). Third, I offer an explanation as to whether securitization gain is merely
the result of a manager’s discretion or a result of the company’s competitive advantage.
Fourth, the findings show whether IFRS, which claims to consist of high-quality
accounting standards, is more effective in an environment with more investor protection.
Finally, in the last part of the dissertation, I investigate the impact of securitization gain
on the value-relevance of return on equity. To the best of my knowledge, these issues
have not been investigated or addressed in prior studies.
In this dissertation, I attempt to examine the following research questions:
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Research Questions for Paper 1:
What is the impact of different approaches of specific accounting standards, IAS 39 (riskbased approach) and SFAS 140 (control-based approach), on meeting analysts’ forecasts
using fair-value accounting in securitization transactions? Does the new statement, SFAS
166, improve securitization accounting?
Research Question for Paper 2:
Is there any association between securitization gain and meeting analysts’ forecasts after
controlling for the components of the firm’s competitive advantage?
Research Questions for Paper 3:
a) Does securitization gain decrease the value-relevance of return on equity as a proxy for
the accounting performance measure?
b) What is the joint effect of IFRS and investor protection on meeting analysts’ forecasts
using securitization transactions (risk-based approach)?
The remainder of this dissertation continues with a background on securitization,
fair-value accounting, and each paper’s executive summaries, followed by the three
papers.
II. BACKGROUND
In the following, I provide information about key topics that are closely related to
the research questions raised and discussed in this dissertation.
Fair-Value Accounting
In economies in which the capital market is a source of financing, the
measurement of financial instruments is critical to decision-makers (Deaconu et al.
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2009).Therefore, accounting regulators, the FASB and the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC), have established standards to improve the quality of financial
reporting; however, we still face many challenges. The SEC is strongly-focused on
determining factors and issues related to valuation methods. Beside the standard-setters,
consulting and auditing companies are also concerned with the measurement issues in the
valuation of financial instruments, and they have conducted many studies to investigate
these issues (e.g., Deaconu et al. 2009).
It is true that at the time of issuance or purchase of assets and liabilities, the
historical cost and market/fair value are generally the same, but over time, historical
accounting fails to recognize the changes in the value of assets and liabilities.
Consequently, a company’s financial figures do not reflect the true performance (Wallace
2006). In addition, historical cost-accounting has been criticized for not offering relevant
and up-to-date information to investors and other users of financial reports.
Consequently, the FASB has made a radical change and recommended the use of fairvalue accounting, and required firm provision of additional disclosures of important
information such as interim disclosure of financial instruments’ fair value, techniques
used for fair-value estimation, and inputs to recurring and non-recurring fair-value
measurements (Grant Thornton 2010).
The FASB and the IASB have recently been promoting the adoption of fair-value
accounting since both organizations believe that fair-value accounting produces relevant
financial information (Barlev and Haddad 2003; Landsman 2006; Fiechter 2010).
However, there is a divided opinion about this accounting treatment, and many blame the
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recent financial crisis on fair-value accounting (Laux and Leuz 2009, 2010). Prior
studies argue that the flexibility offered by fair-value accounting creates opportunities for
management to manipulate earnings (Dechow et al. 2010).
SFAS 157, Fair-Value Accounting Measurements
Under historical cost accounting, assets are recognized at their market value at the
time of purchase, and any appreciation in their value is unrecognized until assets are
removed from the owners’ books. However, a decrease in the value of assets is
recognized immediately. Even though historical cost-accounting provides reliable
information because the purchase price of an asset is known and clear, the data based on
historical cost-accounting lacks relevancy because an asset’s market value is often not the
same as its purchased value, and users of financial statements need up-to-date
information to make decisions. On the other hand, under fair-value accounting, any
increase or decrease in the value of assets will affect financial statements. The difficulty
with recording assets at their fair value is that some assets are not traded in the market
regularly, and the determination of their market/fair value is based on management
estimations which are subject to their opportunistic decisions.
To reduce the problem with fair-value estimation, FASB issued SFAS 157 (now
FASB ASC topic 820)4, a guideline that uses different levels of input to assess the value
of assets and liabilities. The first levels of input are prices of identical assets from
transactions by dealers in active markets. However, when identical assets are not

4

SFAS 157 was codified into FASB Accounting Standard Codification Topic 820, Fair
Value Measurements and Disclosures, in 2009.
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available, models which use the second-level inputs, prices of similar assets and other
related data, should be employed to value assets and liabilities. In cases where identical
or similar assets are not available, level-three inputs, unobservable inputs (models), are
used in assessing the value of assets and liabilities.
Starting with level-two inputs and increasing with level three, the ambiguity of
estimation creates opportunities for discretion and manipulation by management.
Deaconu et al. (2009) argue that currently SFAS 157 is the only professional guidance in
the United States with clear direction for fair-value determination for financial-reporting
purposes. Nevertheless, even though SFAS 157 offers helpful guidance for fair-value
measurement, when the market value of the retained portion of a securitized asset is not
available, managers are able to take advantage of the flexibility of fair-value estimation to
manipulate gain from securitization (Bartov 1993; Karaoglu 2005; Dechow et al. 2010).
Securitization
Since the early 1970s, firms have been securitizing their financial assets, such as
receivables, often to a special-purpose entity, which in turn issues securities backed by
the expected cash flows from the securitized assets. This practice has become very
popular all over the world. In the United States alone, close to four trillion dollars of
issued debts were mortgaged or asset-backed securitized bonds during 20035. During the
same period in the European countries, securitized debts reached more than 217 billion
Euros (Adhikari and Betancourt 2008).
5

Bond Market Association, 2004.
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Figure 1 shows the structure of a simple securitization, in which a company
transfers pools of assets, such as trade receivables, to a Special-Purpose Entity (SPE),
which issues securities backed by the expected cash flows from the transferred assets and
pays cash from the sale of securities to transferring firms (Adhikari and Betancourt
2008). A servicing company, usually the transferring company, collects the cash flows.

There are many problems related to the accounting for securitization transactions
that both the FASB and the IASB have been trying to solve. U.S. companies have been
following SFAS 140 (FASB ASC 860) since 2000, and most international companies are
following IAS 39, issued by the International Accounting Standard Board (IASB) in
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2003. SFAS 140 is based on the financial-component approach that focuses on transfer of
control, while IAS 39 emphasizes the transfer of risk. The main issue under both
standards is whether the transaction qualifies as a sale of assets or as a secured
borrowing. Under SFAS 140, it is not hard for managers to construct the securitization as
a sales transaction even when the company maintains partial interest in the asset.
Securitization can generate a gain through different approaches, including:
1- Real earnings management: Firms securitize assets to increase earnings when
managers expect low or volatile earnings.
2- Cherry-picking: Based on historical cost-accounting, assets are reported at their costs
when purchased, and the difference between their cost and fair value is recognized as
a gain/loss when assets are sold. Therefore, for the purpose of securitization,
managers can pick and sell those assets which appreciated most.
3- Accounting policies and rules: In situations in which the transferor retains interest in
the securitized assets, fair-value accounting is used to estimate the value of retained
interest when its market value is not available. The estimation of asset value is subject
to the manager’s discretion6.
4- Timing of transaction: Managers can also time the securitization transaction to have
higher earnings at the end of the reporting period.
Table 1-1 is a summary of securitization-related issues and benefits. As an example,
securitization can increase profit and improve the efficiency ratios.

6

In 2009 FASB published Statement no. 166, a revision to FASB 140. The new standard has
increased the conditions for sales accounting.
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Table 1-1: Summary of Securitization and Related Issues.
Securitization
Securitization is a
process by which

What can be securitized

-Residential mortgage
loans
-Home equity mortgage
1-intangible and
loans
liquid assets are
-Commercial real estate
monetized into cash
mortgage loans
-Automobile loans
2-risk related to the
-Automobile leases
specific assets are
-Boat loans
separated from the
-Credit card receivables
transferor’s (i.e., the -Student loans
originator ) own
-Equipment loans
credit and operating
-Time share loans
risk, and
-Manufactured housing
loans
3-securities are
-Legal fees
issued to investors
-Aircraft leases
which are designed
-Franchisee loans
for the specific risk
Trade receivables
tolerance profile of
-Insurance receivables
such investors.
-Leveraged buyout
loans
-Healthcare receivable
-High yield securities
-Repackaged securities
-Tax liens
-Non-performing loans
-Industrial loans
-Future flow
receivables
-Royalty receivable
-Motorcycle loans
-Mutual fund fees

Benefits

Who securitized

1-the securitization markets are very
active and well developed,

Some companies
use securitization
when bank
financing or
corporate debt
and equity
markets are not
feasible because
either

2- issuers of asset backed securities
can access both the public and
private markets quickly,
3-many domestic and foreign
investors purchase asset backed
securities, so the sponsors of
securitization can secure an
alternative base of investors from
their investor based for equity of
debt offerings,
4-the asset backed securities are
structured with certain credit
enhancements and the credit rating
of such securities can be higher than
the rating of originator or sponsor of
the securitization,
5-intnagible and illiquid asset can
be monetized into cash, and
6-from an accounting standpoint, so
long as the securitization complies
fully with the accounting rules for
sale accounting treatment, an
originator can achieve “off-Balance
Sheet Treatment”, which means that
the liabilities of the Issuing SPE
resulting from the issuance of the
asset backed securities are not
consolidated with or recognized by
the originator on its balance sheet,
but the cash proceeds realized from
the sale of the assets are recognized
by the originator on its balance
sheet, thus enhancing the
originator’s debt-to-equity ratio.

This table is a summary of paper by Kerman Senterfitt (2006).

12

1-the companies
have too much
debt or are
financially
distressed,
2-the companies’
stock price is
low,
3-the capital
markets are not
receptive to the
companies’
offering of new
debt or equity, or
4- the companies
are restricted
from issuing
additional debt
by their credit
arrangements.

International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS)
Before the adoption of IFRS, European countries followed their own domestic
accounting standards. In an attempt to make financial information more comparable
across countries, standard-setters developed IFRS, a common set of standards claimed to
produce comparable and informative financial reports and reduce the information
asymmetry between companies and their investors. Therefore, investors’ costs of
collecting, processing, and comparing information are expected to decline.
Armstrong et al. (2010) find positive reaction to European countries’ adoption of
IFRS and interpret this result as an indication that investors perceive IFRS adoption as
having greater benefits than costs in the adoption and implementation of new standards.
Nonetheless, Armstrong et al. (2010) in further tests find that investors in countries in
which the enforcement of accounting standards is not strong are concerned about the
implementation of IFRS.
The European Union (EU) has been focusing on the integration of capital markets
across countries and, hence, from the beginning of 2005, all companies listed on the
European Union stock exchange are required to prepare their annual financial statements
using IFRS.
Even though the IASB issues IFRS, the European Commission (EC), which is a
private-sector standard setter, needs to approve the standards proposed by the IASB
before companies in EU countries are required to apply them. Furthermore, the EC
accepts a standard only when it meets three main criteria:
1- Standards cannot be contrary to the European Union principle.
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2- Using standards should produce understandable, reliable, relevant, and comparable
reports.
3- Standards should be beneficial to all stakeholders in Europe.
New technology, advanced communication devices, Internet, and speedy
transportation have expanded the market for business and have reduced the barriers of
transactions and contracts across countries. The international market creates
opportunities. At the same time, it means that firms have to deal with different cultures
and business environments. To mitigate the problems associated with international
business, countries around the world have been trying to harmonize the accounting
standards, and the International Accounting Standard Board (IASB) is the organization
that is responsible for setting standards to achieve the harmonization.
Before 2005, about 100 countries either required or allowed their listed
companies to apply IFRS, the standards set by IASB (Brackney and Witmer 2005);
however, the current number of companies has increased to 117 (Chadha 2010 ). The
United States is a longtime supporter of the accounting harmonization and has entered
into an agreement for convergence of U.S. GAAP and IFRS (Norwalk Agreement 2002).
Even the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 requires the FASB to focus on international
convergence and high-quality standards. Nevertheless, early in 2010, the SEC announced
(following SEC Roadmap 2008) that firms cannot start applying IFRS before 2015
(Johnson and Leone 2010). It seems that the SEC’s decision is not exactly what
companies want since, according to a survey conducted by KPMG, about 49% of
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American CEOs would like to have the option of IFRS adoption before 2015 (Chadha
2010).
Comparing SFAS 140 (ASC 860) with IAS 39
The two standards differ in their accounting rules for securitization. SFAS 140,
which is based on a financial-component approach and focuses on transfer of control,
allows for sales accounting if control is either complete or partial. Under IAS 39, which
focuses on the transfer of risk, firms use various measurement methods based on
managers’ intention toward financial assets. Under SFAS No. 140, transfer of financial
assets is a sale when:
1- The transferred assets have been isolated from the transferor,
2- The transferee has the right to pledge or exchange the assets, and
3- The transferor does not maintain effective control over the assets (ASC 860).
The first condition assures that in the case of financial problems, the transferor’s
creditors have no access to the securitized assets. If these three conditions hold, then the
transaction qualifies as a sale, the revenue is recognized and the asset is removed from
the transferor’s books, and the carrying value of the transferred asset is allocated among
the new financial components based on fair values. If any of the above conditions are not
met, then the transaction is considered to be a secured borrowing, in which case the level
of the transferor’s leverage will increase.
Accounting for securitization under IAS 39 differs significantly from accounting
under SFAS 140. Following IAS 39, we first determine the portion of a financial asset
that is being evaluated for the purpose of de-recognition. Normally, the transferor needs
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to apply the de-recognition test for the entire asset even if the transferor is transferring
only a portion of the financial asset. In special cases, however, such as when the
transferred portion includes one of the: a) explicitly identified cash flows, b) fully
proportionate share of explicitly identified cash flows, or c) fully proportionate share of
cash flows, the de-recognition test is not applied.
The next steps are the de-recognition steps, starting with checking whether the
asset’s cash flow has expired. An asset is de-recognized when its cash flow has expired;
otherwise, we need to establish whether a transfer has happened or not. A transfer takes
place when the contractual right to the cash flow of a financial asset is transferred, or the
contractual right to the cash flow is retained and the cash flow is transferred to a third
party given the following three specific conditions:
1- The transferor must pass all the collected cash flows without any delay; however, the
transferor can invest the cash flows in cash or cash equivalents.
2- The transferor can sell securities only to pay the third party,
3- The transferor is obligated to transfer only the cash flows collected.
If the above conditions are not met, then the asset cannot be de-recognized. When
the above conditions are met, the next step is to check the transfer of the risks and
rewards. An asset is de-recognized when substantially all the risks and rewards are
transferred7.

7

Note: In order to decide whether risks and rewards have been transferred, we need to
compare the entity’s exposure to variability in the amount and timing of the transferred asset’s net
cash flows before and after transfer. When this variability in relation to changes in the transferred
asset’s future net cash flows is not significant, then substantially all the risks and rewards have
been transferred. Conversely, when after the transfer of asset, a firm’s exposure to variability

16

Adhikari and Betancourt (2008) argue that in most securitizations, neither of the
two situations (retaining or transferring substantially all the risks and rewards) happens,
and as a result, in most securitizations under IAS 39, we need to examine the control over
the asset to determine the de-recognition. In transactions where the transferee is able to
sell the transferred asset to a third party, control is transferred (not retained) and the asset
is de-recognized. However, since in securitization transactions, an entity sells the assets
to a special-purpose entity (SPE) which is not permitted to sell transferred assets, in most
securitizations, control is retained by the transferor, and we should look at the form of
control retained by the transferor.
The criteria for meeting the sales transaction under SFAS Statement 140 are
easier than those under IAS 39, allowing managers to structure the securitization as sales
transactions even when they retain partial interest in the securitized assets. Consequently,
managers can use subjective assumptions to manipulate earnings through fair-value
valuation of the retained interest.
The challenging issue relating to securitization for followers of both the U.S.
GAAP and the IFRS is the accounting for securitization transaction. Deciding on whether
the transaction is a sale of an asset or is a secured borrowing creates problems. Secured
borrowing increases the liabilities, while the sale of an asset requires the removal of the
asset from the balance sheet and recognition of gain/loss (the difference between
proceeds received and book value of the asset). Therefore, the criteria employed in

does not change, then substantially all the risks and rewards have been retained (Adhikari and
Betancourt 2008) and the asset is not de-recognized.
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deciding whether the transaction is a sale or secured borrowing will result in different
financial numbers. Under SFAS 140, a financial-components control approach is used,
while under IAS 39, a risk and reward and financial-components approach is used.
The definitions and detailed comparisons of these two approaches are explained in Table
1-2.

Table 1-2
Comparisons of Provisions of SFAS 140 and IAS 39

Issue
SFAS 140
DeFinancial Components Control
recognition Model

Control is surrendered if three tests
are met:
1. Assets must be isolated from the
transferor and the transferor’s
creditors
2.Ttransferee can freely pledge or
exchange Transferred assets
3. Transferor does not effectively
maintain control through a
repurchase agreement

IAS 39
Risk and Rewards and Financial
Components Control Model. Also
adds concept of “continuing
enrolment”
Multiple steps required to evaluate
de-recognition:
Pre de-recognition step:
1. Determine if all or part of asset
must be evaluated

De-recognition steps:
1. Evaluate if rights to cash flows
expired
2. Determine if transfer has taken
place
If these three conditions are met, the 3. Apply risk and reward approach
transferor records a “sale” using the 4. Apply control approach
financial components approach. If
5. Apply continuing involvement
the three conditions are not met, the Essentially, starting with detransaction is accounted for as a
recognition step 1, at each step, an
secured borrowing
entity evaluates whether drecognition and/or recognition is
appropriate. If no conclusion is
reached, the entity moves on to the
next step.
This table is adopted from Adhikari and Betancourt (2008).
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III. EXECUTIVE SUMMARIES
In the first paper, CHAPTER II, I investigate U.S. companies that are engaged in
securitization transactions and test the possibility of earnings management using
securitization. I find evidence of earnings management using securitization for the period
2005-2006 (before the financial crisis) for companies following U.S. GAAP. My results
do not support the discount-rate hypothesis. That is, the discount rate, as well as fair
value, is not the main source of earnings management. One possible explanation for the
observed positive association between meeting/beating analysts’ forecasts and
securitization gain during 2005-2006 is that under SFAS No. 140, the conditions for
sales-accounting securitization were easily met, and managers were able to manage
earnings. I did not find the same results for 2008-2009 because during this period,
companies were under more scrutiny as they faced financial difficulties. Under this
condition, the opportunity for securitization was low, and managers became more
conservative (a claim that has not yet been empirically tested).
In the second paper, CHAPTER III, I study U.S. companies that have reported a
securitization gain during 2005-2006 (before the financial crisis), 2008-2009 (after the
crisis), and 2010 (when financial statements reflect the impact of SFAS Statement 166).
The result of regression analysis is that there is a significant association between
meeting/beating earnings forecast and securitization gain during the period before the
crisis, indicating that the earnings management is the source of securitization gain and not
competitive advantage. However, there is no positive correlation between securitization
gain and competitive advantage for any time period. Also, there is no indication of
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earnings management for the period 2008-2010. It is argued, but not yet proven, that
companies have become more conservative since the issuance of SFAS 166.
Finally, in the third paper, CHAPTER IV, I first study IFRS companies that are
engaged in securitization transactions, and test the possibility that earnings management
using securitization transactions among companies that operate under different legal
systems and anti-director laws is less. My findings indicate that companies that are
engaged in securitization transactions and operate under IFRS, on average, exhibit no
earnings management. The explanation I suggest is that IFRS regulations with regard to
securitization are intense enough to reduce the extent of manipulation of financial
statements under any type of investor protection. Then I use all U.S. companies that are
engaged in securitization transactions to examine the value-relevance of an accountingperformance measure, return on equity. My findings indicate that, in the first period
(2005-2006), the value-relevance of return on equity decreases as a result of
securitization gain. This was not the case for the second period (2008-2009) and the third
period (2010).
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CHAPTER II
PAPER ONE: FAIR VALUE, SECURITIZATION,
AND EARNINGS MANAGEMENT
I. INTRODUCTION
Since the 1970s, securitization has become a popular method of raising capital.
However, securitization transaction is highly complex and can create information
asymmetry between management and investors. Some investors are informed, understand
the complexity, and can make educated decisions. Credit-rating agencies, to some degree,
are able to inform the public and reduce the information asymmetries (Iscobucci et al.
2006). Nevertheless, the complexities related to the securitization process still can allow
managers to act opportunistically and offer low-value (high-risk) assets to less-informed
investors.
Prior research claims that managers can generate gains from securitization by
taking advantage of the flexibilities incorporated in fair-value accounting rules when
estimating the value of securitized assets (Dechow et al. 2010). Dechow et al. (2010)
show that managers use rules of fair-value accounting to pick a discount rate that creates
higher gain when estimating the fair value of securitized assets. The main goal of my first
paper is to investigate the prior study’s findings, extend their research further by looking
at a different timeframe, and also to investigate companies following IAS 39 for
securitization transactions. I posit and show that under U.S. GAAP, managers do use
securitization to meet/beat analysts’ earnings forecasts. I also show that IFRS’ rigid rules
for securitization reduce the possibility of managers manipulating earnings.
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Securitization is a complex process and involves fair-value accounting, which is
criticized for being flexible. However, both the Financial Accounting Standard Board
(FASB) and the International Accounting Standard Board (IASB) promote fair-value
accounting to increase the information-relevance of financial reports (Barlev and Haddad
2003; Landsman 2006; Fiechter 2010). On the other hand, critics of fair-value accounting
blame the flexibility and subjectivity of fair-value accounting for many economic
problems and financial crises (Laux and Leuz 2009, 2010). Consequently, the
shortcoming of fair-value accounting affects accounting for asset securitization because
fair-value estimation is used in securitization transactions when the transferor of assets
retains partial interest in the sold assets (Karaoglu 2005; Hunton et al. 2006; Dechow et
al. 2010). Depending on how management constructs the transaction, securitization can
be accounted for as a sales transaction or it can be recorded as a secured borrowing,
which means an increase in the firm’s leverage. Securitizations can open the door to
earnings manipulation and other unacceptable practices by managers. Managers can use
securitizations to manipulate earnings, transfer risky assets to third parties, and be lenient
in giving credit to customers with no or bad credit (Dechow et al. 2010).
Another issue that of late has been extensively and inconclusively debated by
regulators, standard-setters, the global investment community, and the accounting
profession is the convergence of the U.S. GAAP and International Financial Accounting
Standards (IFRS) to create a higher-quality set of accounting standards. Standard-setters
around the world are trying to create a single set of accounting standards that produces
comparable financial statements for all firms worldwide, since the majority of companies
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have subsidiaries or branches in more than one country, and investors prefer financial
reports that are more comparable and understandable.
Lately, a number of studies have focused on the issues related to the convergence
of the U.S. GAAP and IFRS. Examples of these issues are the market reactions to
companies adopting IFRS and managerial discretion under IFRS standards (Hamberg et
al. 2009; Armstrong et al. 2010). Since the main focus of this dissertation is
securitization, and studying securitization involves many other issues, such as accounting
policies across countries and accounting requirements under U.S. GAAP and IFRS, these
issues are examined in relation to each other as a holistic approach. Fair-value
accounting, securitization, and investor protection have not been fully studied in
combination.
An important question for participants in the U.S. capital market is whether
convergence with international accounting standards would benefit the U.S. economy.
The accounting standards of both U.S. GAAP and IFRS have been challenged in terms of
their complexity, relevance, and usefulness, so the main purpose of this dissertation is to
address these challenges in relation to the securitization process. I expect my results to
provide evidence to support the standard-setters’ efforts to evaluate the possibility of total
convergence of the two standards. Investors also need to have access to higher-quality
reports and to assess which method better protects their wealth against the opportunistic
actions of managers.
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The rest of this paper is organized as follows. First, I offer background and
explanation on some important issues, and then continue with hypothesis development,
data collection, empirical tests, results, and conclusions.
II. BACKGROUND AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT
Earnings Management
Most associates of firms base their relationship with the company on the firm’s
earnings. The firm’s senior executives are evaluated and rewarded based on company
earnings (Healy 1985), most banks give loans to companies with good performance, and
boards of directors use earnings to evaluate the management. Therefore, if the earnings
are below the analysts’ expectations, the company may face many problems, such as
difficulty in raising capital, purchasing supplies, keeping valuable employees, and
sustaining a good reputation, as well as losing stock value, and many others.
To investigate the importance of earnings, Graham et al. (2005) conducted a
survey which showed that more than 73 percent of the 400 interviewed CFOs revealed
that analysts’ forecasts of earnings per share (EPS) is very important, and meeting that
forecast is critical. Also, 65% of participants admitted that reporting a profit is important
enough to manipulate earnings (Graham et al. 2005). According to the financial press, the
following three benchmarks are very important to a company’s CEO: 1- showing profit,
2- having sustainable earnings, and 3-meeting analysts’ forecasts (Degeorge et al. 1999).
Considering the importance of earnings, studies find that managers use several
methods of managing earnings, starting with using accruals (which is very common),
setting allowances for doubtful accounts, and the sale of assets or securitization
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(Subramanyam 1996; Lee 2007). On the other hand, Cahan et al. (2008) show that
managers use income-smoothing in order to communicate with investors about the
company’s future.
Other studies show that U.K. firms actually avoid missing analysts' forecasts;
specifically, they show that managers in the U.K. generally don’t like negative-earnings
surprises (Gore et al. 2007; Athanasakou et al. 2009). Also, studies have shown that the
market perceives negative-earnings surprises as bad news and rewards positive-earnings
surprises (Skinner and Sloan 2002; Athanasakou et al. 2009). Brown and Caylor (2005)
show evidence of a significant increase in rewards (penalty) of meeting (missing)
earnings forecasts. Consequently, managers are very concerned about analysts’ earnings
forecasts.
Furthermore, a prior study shows that earnings management is a common practice
all over the world; however, companies in European countries manage earnings more
often than their American counterparts (Leuz et al. 2003). Following prior studies (e.g.,
Degeorge et al.1999; Kasznik and McNichols 2002; Graham et al. 2005; Lee 2007), I use
meeting or beating analysts’ forecasts as a proxy for earnings management.
Fair-Value Accounting
Research shows that fair-value accounting and its required disclosures produce
information that investors value; however, the quality and amount of information depend
on the measurement and estimation methods used by managers (Landsman 2006). The
SEC strongly supports fair-value accounting (as the sole accounting method) based on the
idea that fair-value accounting can reduce the motivation for management opportunistic
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behavior using the existing complexity of mixed accounting standards (historical and
fair-value) (Landsman 2006). Paananen (2009) finds evidence that investors value the
increase in the level of disclosures required by fair-value accounting because by using the
fair-value accounting, they believe they can better predict the company’s future
performance and make better and more educated decisions.
Contrary to investors, preparers of financial reports believe that when unrealized
gains and losses are included in income, the profit volatility will rise (Cloney 1996).
Byrne et al. (2008) find that U.K. firms’ managers show different levels of conservatism
in relation to the implementation of the fair-value accounting, and these variations (in
their estimation) create inconsistencies in reports across different companies.
Most research on fair value is concerned with its flexibility in different areas,
such as measurement of intangible assets (e.g., Deaconu et al. 2009). Fair-value
estimation issues have also created concerns in relation to asset securitization, and many
studies are devoted to this dilemma. Dechow and Shakespeare (2009) examine how
managers utilize the timing of asset securitization to increase the benefits of the
transaction. A comprehensive comparison of securitization under the U.S. GAAP and the
IFRS standard by Adhikari and Betancourt (2008) and management earningsmanipulation in securitization by Dechow et al. (2010) are among other studies in this
line of research. Even the SEC points out the problem with fair-value measurement for
financial instruments that are not traded in the active market, and asset valuation based on
managers’ estimation.
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Barlev and Haddad (2003) argue that fair-value accounting, unlike historical cost
accounting, is more value-relevant and better portrays the real financial position and
income of a company, helps limit agency costs, and improves management efficiency.
Laux and Leuz (2009) investigated whether fair-value accounting really did cause
economic problems and concluded that fair-value accounting could not have added to the
financial and economic problems. Degeorge et al. (1999) and Brown and Caylor (2005)
also show evidence that managers believe avoiding quarterly losses has the highest
priority. However, further research shows that managers’ concerns have changed
recently, and the findings by Degeorge et al. (1999) are not applicable over time (Dechow
et al. 2003; Graham et al. 2005). Additional investigation by Brown and Caylor (2005)
shows that, in every sample year, managers are most concerned with avoiding negative
earnings surprises. A good explanation for this result is that managers strongly favor the
development of credibility with investors and other stakeholders and try to improve the
company’s stock price (Graham et al. 2005). Managers are afraid of losing their jobs,
their bonuses, the firm’s stock price, and their reputation. Consequently, they don’t want
to miss earnings thresholds.
Hypothesis Development
Dechow et al. (2010) investigate the association between income-smoothing and
the securitization gain of a sample of American firms during the period when SFAS No.
140, which is based on a financial-component approach and focuses on transfer of
control, was in effect. They show evidence of income-smoothing, and they relate this
earnings management to vagueness incorporated in fair-value accounting. Under SFAS
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140, constructing the transaction as the sale of an asset and de-recognizing the asset is
easily done, even when the transferor retains partial interest in the asset (Niu and
Richardson 2006). Dechow et al. (2010) argue that since, under SFAS No. 140, the fair
value of expected future cash flows of the retained portion of a securitized asset must be
estimated when no active market value is available, managers are able to pick a discount
rate that creates higher gains or lower losses.
SFAS 140 follows the “surrender of control” concept to determine the accounting
for securitized assets. If the transaction meets the specific criteria (explained earlier) and
the transferor does not have control over the transferred assets, then the transaction is
accounted as a sale. However, if the criteria are not met and the transferor retains control,
then the transaction is accounted as a secured borrowing, the receivables remain on the
transferor’s books, and any amount received in the transaction is recorded as borrowing.
Accounting for securitization under IAS 39 is more complicated and follows a
combination of “risk and reward” and “control” approaches. The criteria for derecognition under IAS 39 are rigid (Adhikari and Betancourt 2008); however, if
transaction meets a set of criteria (explained earlier), and the transferor maintains control
through withholding of a subordinated interest, then the transferor uses the financialcomponent approach (control) and allocates the carrying value of the asset between the
components based on fair values (Adhikari and Betancourt 2008). Adhikari and
Betancourt (2008) show that most securitizations which meet the criteria for sales
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transaction and de-recognition of assets under U.S. GAAP (FAS 140) would not be
qualified for de-recognition under IAS 391.
Given that it is not possible to observe or calculate earnings manipulation directly,
we need to examine the possibility of earnings management indirectly. According to the
Agency Theory, there is a conflict of interest between management and investors. First,
executives are typically motivated to engage in earnings management primarily because
their compensation and bonuses are tied to the reported earnings, and when they have the
opportunity to do so, they have the ability and knowledge to manipulate numbers to meet
their earnings targets. Second, management also has an incentive to manipulate financial
statements to comply with debt covenants. Since the standards issued by IASB over the
last few years have changed the measurement method from historical cost to fair value,
managers are able to estimate the fair value for assets that are not being traded in the
actual market.
The simplicity of criteria under SFAS 140 creates opportunities for managers to
sell financial assets and generate gain using the flexibilities of fair-value accounting.
However, rigid criteria for securitization under IAS 39 prevent managers’ discretionary
actions. As a result, I expect to find earnings management measured by meeting/beating
analysts’ forecast for companies complying with SFAS 140 only. The existence of
incentives, along with the opportunities and capability to manipulate accounting numbers,
1

The accounting for securitization under standards set by the SFAS 140 and by the IASB
(IAS 39) were very different; however, in 2009 the FASB issued a new standard (SFAS no.166)
which reduces the differences between the two standards. Thus, this paper investigates the
securitization under both standards before and after the issuance of the new rules.
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provide rationalization to management to engage in earnings management as stated in the
following hypotheses2. Given that meeting/beating analysts’ earnings forecasts are
extensively used as a proxy for earnings management in prior studies (e.g., Degeorge et
al. 1999; Kasznik and McNichols 2002; Graham et al. 2005; Lee 2007), I have used the
same proxy in my study.
H1: There is positive association between meeting or beating analysts’ forecasts and
securitization gain under both risk-based and control-based approach.
I test the above hypothesis for companies that follow U.S. GAAP (control-based
or financial-components approach) and IFRS (risk-based approach) separately, and
expect that my findings only support the hypothesis for companies that follow U.S.
GAAP.
Dechow et al. (2010) argue that the discount rate is the tool for showing
securitization gain, so following their study, I investigate this claim and predict that there
is a negative association between the discount rate and securitization gain under U.S.
GAAP. Therefore, I hypothesize that:
H2: For companies that follow U.S. GAAP (control-based approach), there is a negative
association between securitization gain and discount rate used in fair-value
estimation.
III. DATA COLLECTION AND METHODOLOGY
This section discusses the data collection and the methodology used in this study.

2

Earnings management in these hypotheses is defined as any attempt by management to meet
or beat analysts’ forecasts of annual earnings.
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Data Collection
I used LexisNexis and several key words to find all companies in the U.S. and in
the world that have used securitization transactions during the periods 2005-2006 and
2008-2010 and have almost all of the related data. I have come up with a total of 355
company-year observations for 71 companies that follow the U.S. GAAP, and a total of
205 company-year observations for 41 companies that follow IFRS. Dechow et al. (2010)
made a similar study in the period between 2000 and 2005 and collected a total of 96
companies. Given that the size of securitization activities has declined significantly since
the 2000-2005 period, I believe the chance I have missed any company that is engaged in
securitization activities and have not included it in my list is extremely low. For IFRS3
companies, the search was much harder since companies across countries use different
terms for one concept. I used “securitisation”, “securitization”, “financial asset”,
“receivable”, and many more key terms to find companies with securitization activities. I
reviewed companies’ annual financial reports (10-K) and hand-collected the
securitization data including income from securitizations, fair value of the retained
interests (U.S. companies only) in securitized assets, and discount rates used in
estimating fair values. LexisNexis and Google Finance were extremely helpful in finding
companies’ financial reports, stock information, email addresses, and phone numbers.
For the most part, non-U.S. companies did not report the discount rate that they
had used to estimate fair value, and only mentioned that they used the related period’s

3

My data consists of companies which have adopted IFRS by 2005 (APRA 2004; PWC
2011; EUROPA 2011).
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discount rate, so I had to look that up in a very time-consuming process. I used
companies following U.S. GAAP and companies following IFRS to test the hypotheses.
In addition, I used : a) the Research Insights (COMPUSTAT) database to collect the
financial data, b) the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) database to collect
monthly stock returns and stock prices, c) the SEC’s Edgar database to look at
companies’ 10-K reports, d) the Institutional Brokers’ Estimate System (I/B/E/S) to
collect analysts’ earnings and return forecasts, and e) Lexis-Nexis and other online
sources as well as direct phone calls and email to individuals in Europe.
Under SFAS 1404, firms are required to provide more information, such as
income from securitization, amount of gains, interest rates employed by managers, fair
values of retained assets in securitization, and adverse changes at the end of the year. The
data collection for companies following IFRS was complicated by the fact that each
country has different requirements, and companies use different terminology for
reporting the same concepts. In contrast to U.S. companies, which disclose information in
a simple and straightforward method, IFRS companies are not required to disclose
information such as the discount rate used in estimating fair value or the amount of
retained interest in securitized assets.

4

FASB statement no. 166, the revision to SFAS no. 140, has increased the required
disclosure level; therefore, U.S. companies' annual reports under GAAP should be more
informative.
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Methodology
In this paper, I investigate securitization under U.S. GAAP and IFRS and test
whether managers take advantage of fair-value accounting to meet or beat analysts’
forecasts using gain on sale accounting securitization.
Earnings management:
As I mentioned earlier, consistent with prior studies (e.g., Degeorge et al. 1999;
Kasznik and McNichols 2002; Graham et al. 2005; Lee 2007), I use meeting or beating
analysts’ forecasts as a proxy for earnings management. I define MEET=1 when earnings
surprise is non-negative and MEET= 0 when earnings surprise is negative. Earnings
surprise is the difference between actual earnings and median analysts’ earnings
forecasts. There are some companies that normally do well year-after-year and meet the
earnings forecasts regardless of securitization gain. Consequently, if a company’s
earnings before securitization gain do not meet the forecast and the company can
construct a securitization that raises the income enough to meet or beat the forecast, then
there is a high probability that the company is engaged in earnings management since the
manager has discretion in estimating the fair value of retained interest in sold securities.
Therefore, I use the following Logit model to test my first hypothesis (H1). I
separately run the same model both for companies that follow the U.S. GAAP and
companies that follow IFRS. The positive sign of the coefficient of SEC-GAIN supports
my hypotheses.

P (MEETit) = f ( β0 + β1SEC-GAINit + β2 PRESEC-EARit + β3IND-GAINt+ β4 ADVCHAN/RTit + β5 MKT-VOLit + β6DIS-RATEit + β7 SIZEit + β8 SEGit ) … (1-1)
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Where:
MEETit: Is a dummy variable equal to one when earnings surprises are non-negative and
zero otherwise. Earning surprise is the difference between actual earnings and
median analysts’ earnings forecasts for firm i in year t (Collected from I/B/E/S).
SEC-GAINit: Securitization gain for firm i at the end of year t is collected from firm’s
10K and it is scaled by last year’s stockholders equity.
PRESEC-EARit: Earnings before securitization gain for firm i at the end of year t (also is
a proxy for manager incentive for earnings management). All earnings data are
collected from companies’ 10-Ks filed with the SEC.
Consistent with Dechow et al. (2010), I use the following control variables:
INDU-GAINt : Average securitization gain of companies in the same industry at the end
of year t deflated by the stockholders’ equity.
ADV-CHAN/RI it: Adverse change divided by retained interest for firm i at the end of
year t used as a proxy for risk. Adverse change is a measure of volatility in
expected future cash flows of financial assets.
MKT-VOL it: Market volatility for firm i at the end of year t as a proxy for risk.
DIS- RATE it: Discount rate for firm i at the end of year t used in estimation of fair values
of assets5.
Additional control variables used in this model are:
SIZE it: Natural log of total assets for firm i at the end of year t.
5

U.S. companies are required to report the discount rate that they use in fair value
calculation.
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SEG it: Number of operating segments for firm i at the end of year t.
Investment Opportunity:
Depending on the efficiency and competitiveness of the industry, the size of
spread6 should vary. To control for this variation in the industry, INDUSTRY-GAIN is
defined as the median level of gains from securitizations deflated by equity in the
industry by year.
Receivables Cash Flows Volatility:
Dechow et al. (2010) use two proxies for risk because the volatility in expected
cash flows from securitized receivables7 is not directly measurable. Managers use
estimation to calculate the fair value of the retained interest in securitized assets as the
present value of future expected cash flows8. The adverse change collected from notes
and disclosures to financial statements represents an estimate of the variance related to
the expected future cash flows (Dechow et al. 2010).Therefore, higher variance is
indicative of higher volatility of assets. Consequently, firms with greater adverse change
in relation to the retained securitization interest should show higher gains or losses. When
estimating the fair value of retained interest in securitized assets, managers have to make
assumptions about the discount rate used to calculate the present value of future expected

6

The difference between the asking price and the bid of stock or other security is called bidask spread.
7

Volatile cash flows increase the risk.

8

U.S. companies report estimated fair value of the retained interest in securitization in their
Balance Sheets. They also report the sensitivities of the estimated fair values to adverse changes
to assumptions in the notes to financial statements.
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cash flows, default risk, and prepayment risk. Therefore, a manager can show higher gain
by assuming lower risk, which results in lower adverse change and higher gain.
ADVERSE-CHANGE/RI: This is the first proxy for risk and is defined as adverse
change divided by retained interest (from the 10-k filing). The second proxy for risk is
the firm-specific market volatility (MAR-VOL). In some securitizations, the transferor
assumes all the risks, which means that the third party is at no risk if the company faces
financial problems (Gorton and Souleles 2006). Therefore, the volatility of the market
should be directly related to the volatility of receivable cash flows. To calculate this
variable, I first regress the monthly stock returns on the value-weighted NYSE/AMEX
index and then find the standard deviation of the residuals of this regression.
DIS-RATE:The discount rate reported by the firm in the notes to the financial statement.
Discount rate has an important role in the size of the gain from securitization transaction,
and a lower (higher) discount rate can result in larger (smaller) gain.
SEG: The number of segments in the company. Companies for which securitization is an
important source of financing should have a higher gain (as a percentage of equity
capital) when they operate in one segment only.
Additional control variables:
SIZE: The natural log of the market value of equity. Larger companies have more
securities to use for financing.
LEVERAGE: Total liabilities scaled by prior-year equity. Companies with a higher level
of liability are more likely to mange earnings to meet forecasts.
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Discount Rate
Next, following the Dechow et al. (2010) argument that managers use desirable
discount rates in the estimation of fair-value accounting to smooth earnings, I investigate
whether managers’ discretion on discount rates plays any role in meeting or beating
forecasts. When securitizations meet the sale’s requirement, the transferor removes all the
receivables from its records and collects cash from the buyer. When the transferor firm
retains partial interest in the sold receivables, managers use estimation to fair value the
future cash flows related to their interests in the securitized assets (Dechow et al. 2010).
When estimating the fair value of the cash flows of the retained interest, managers might
use a lower discount rate to show higher fair value and higher gain. Therefore, I use a
regression model similar to that used by Dechow et al. (2010), with some additional
variables.
To test H2, I use the following multivariable linear regression model separately
for U.S.
companies.

DIS-RATEit = β0 + β1SEC-GAINit + β2 PRESEC-EARit + β3INT-SEC-PREit
+ β4 LVRGit + β5 SIZEit + β6 LIQUIDITYit + β7 BETAit + β8 ROAit + εi
… (1-2)
Where:
DIS- RATE it: Discount rate for firm i at the end of year t used in estimation of fair values
of assets9.

9

U.S. companies are required to report the discount rate that they use in fair value
calculation.
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SEC-GAINit: Securitization gain for firm i at the end of year t is collected from the firm’s
10K and is scaled by last year’s stockholder equity.
PRESEC-EARit: Earnings before securitization gain for firm i at the end of year t (also is
a proxy for manager incentive for earnings management). All earnings data are
collected from companies’ 10-Ks filed with the SEC.
INT-SEC-PREit: The interaction variable between securitization gain and earnings before
securitization gain for firm i at the end of year t.
Other control variables:
LVRGit: Total liabilities divided by total assets for firm i at the end of year t.
SIZE it: Natural log of total assets for firm i at the end of year t.
LIQUIDITYit: Total cash and cash equivalent divided by total assets for firm i at the end
of year t.
BETAit: A measure of the systematic risk for firm i in year t (collected from
COMPUSTAT).
ROAit: Return on assets for firm i at the end of year t (collected from COMPUSTAT).
Variables used in the equation are as defined above. The significance and negative sign
of the coefficient of SEC-GAIN supports my second hypothesis (H2).
IV. RESULTS
Table 2-1 presents the descriptive statistics for all U.S. companies used to test the
hypothesis. The study consists of 71 companies with 355 company-year observations
from the beginning of 2005 up to the end of 2010, excluding 2007. The extreme financial
and economic changes during 2007, including the bankruptcy of high-profile companies,
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credit crunches, and damaged investors’ confidence, had extraordinary impacts on the
market, and financial reports did not represent the normal course of business during this
period. I have divided the data into three time periods to control for the effects of
economic and financial changes. I use a Logit model with panel data for the first two
periods (2005-2006 and 2008-2009) and a Logit model with cross-sectional data for the
third period (2010). Using the residual analysis, all outliers are detected and removed
from the regression model. In the residual analysis, I ran the original model and
calculated the residual-squared then plotted the residual-squared against each
independent variable to find outliers.

Table 2-1
Descriptive Statistics for Paper One
(companies following U.S. GAAP – Control based approach)
(Year 2007 is the crises year and is excluded from the analyses)
Panel A: 2005-2006
Variable

Obs

Mean

Std. Dev.

25th %tile

Median

75th %tile

Min

Max

MEETit

142

0.2535211

0.436567

0

0

1

0

1

SEC-GAINit

143

0.0096119

0.072749

0

8.45E-07

0.0002409

0.00

0.83

PRESEC-EARit

142

0.019833

0.171974

-0.0000822

1.60E-06

0.0003064

-0.59739

1.599

INDU-GAINt

142

9.999261

77.19853

0.0259588

0.2875352

3.299046

-0.5885

920.1

ADV-CHAN/RIit

142

-0.245455

2.723875

-0.001154

0

0

-32.4408

3E-04

MKT-VOLit

142

0.0277697

0.038971

0.0034914

0.0156763

0.0367135

0.00

0.236

DIS-RATEit

130

0.1420754

0.13874

0.1

0.11225

0.1385

0.06

0.98

SIZEit

126

9.229762

2.565112

7.5475

8.965

10.78

1.97

14.45

SEGit

142

2.732394

2.126881

1

2

4

1

10

39

Table 2-1
Descriptive Statistics for Paper One (Continued)
Panel B: 2008-2009
Variable

Obs

Mean

Std. Dev.

25th %tile

Median

75th %tile

Min

Max

MEETit

142

0.542254

0.499975

0

1

1

0

1

SEC-GAINit

142

0.018526

0.093198

0

0.0002059

0.0102173

0.0000

0.490933

PRESEC-EARit

142

0.015754

0.449393

-0.0100816

-0.0002268

0.0000568

-1.67161

4.918738

INDU-GAINt

142

0.691559

1.233717

0.0302982

0.15334

0.6233758

-0.12179

6.185644

ADV-CHAN/RIit

142

-0.00085

0.017072

-0.001015

-0.0000339

O

-0.064

0.183898

MKT-VOLit

142

0.068028

0.064254

0.0102884

0.0531474

0.0947665

0.0000

0.279185

DIS-RATEit

136

0.140136

0.134514

0.1

0.11

0.13205

0.06

0.98

SIZEit

124

9.244106

2.669727

7.290797

8.966519

11.0027

3.619851

14.6145

SEGit

142

2.669014

1.991905

1

2

4

1

10

Variable

Obs

Mean

Std. Dev.

25th %tile

Median

75th %tile

Min

Max

MEETit

71

0.542254

0.499975

0

1

1

0

1

SEC-GAINit

71

0.577465

0.497479

0

0.0000136

0.0003102

0.00000

0.170963

PRESEC-EARit

71

0.006407

0.025225

-0.0000654

0.0000415

0.0605711

-0.17096

0.964404

INDU-GAINt

71

0.068115

0.186212

0.0025677

0.0289697

0.1151988

-1.93064

3.639035

ADV-CHAN/RIit

71

0.214401

0.709928

-0.0006022

-1.02E-07

0

-0.16894

0.230888

MKT-VOLit

71

-0.00049

0.03463

0.0072358

0.0538238

0.0832345

0.00000

0.166453

DIS-RATEit

67

0.052035

0.043184

0.1

0.1061

0.13

0.0394

0.974

SIZEit

59

0.137149

0.136754

7.408278

9.15173

11.06695

3.633922

14.63305

SEGit

71

9.330365

2.721738

1

2

4

1

10

Panel c: 2010

Where:
MEETit: Is a dummy variable equal to one when earnings surprises are non-negative and zero otherwise.
Earnings surprise is the difference between actual earnings and median analysts’ earnings
forecasts for firm i in year t (Collected from I/B/E/S).
SEC-GAINit: Securitization gain for firm i at the end of year t is collected from firm’s 10K and is scaled by
last year’s stockholder equity.
PRESEC-EARit: Earnings before securitization gain for firm i at the end of year t (also is a proxy for
manager incentive for earnings management). All earnings data are collected from companies’ 10Ks filed with the SEC.
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INDU-GAINt : Average securitization gain of companies in the same industry at the end of year t deflated
by the stockholders’ equity.
ADV-CHAN/RI it: Adverse change divided by retained interest for firm i at the end of year t used as a
proxy for risk. Adverse change is a measure of volatility in expected future cash flows of
financial assets.
MKT-VOL it: Market volatility for firm i at the end of year t as a proxy for risk.
DIS- RATE it: Discount rate for firm i at the end of year t used in estimation of fair values of assets10.
SIZE it: Natural log of total assets for firm i at the end of year t.
SEG it: Number of operating segments for firm i at the end of year t.

Table 2-2 contains the results from the Pearson correlation matrices. Any variable
with a strong correlation to other variables has been eliminated from my models. The
three panels of Table 2-2 represent the for each time period. As shown in the tables, there
are some significant correlations (indicated by * as marginally significant or p-value
between 0.05 and 0.1, ** as significant or p-value between .01 and 0.05, and *** as
highly significant or p-value less than 0.01) among variables; however, none of the
correlations show any sign of multicollinearity. The common rule of thumb for
identifying multicollinearity is a variance inflation factor (VIF) of 10 or more, or
tolerance of 0.1 or less. Another way is to examine the bivariate correlations between
independent variables and look for a correlation of 0.7 or higher. Lastly, muticollinearity
may be present when the overall model is significant but none of the independent
variables are significant. After dropping variables that show a high bivariate correlation,
my analysis does not show any of the above symptoms.

10

U.S. companies are required to report the discount rate that they use in fair value
calculation.
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Table 2-2
Correlation Matrices for Paper One
(companies following U.S. GAAP – Control based approach)
Panel A: 2005-2006
SEC-GAINit

PRESEC-EARit

INDU-GAINt

ADV-CHAN/RIit

MKT-VOLit

DIS-RATEit

SIZEit

SEC-GAINit

1

PRESEC-EARit

-0.2478***

1

INDU-GAINt

0.0024

0.1229

1

ADV-CHAN/RIit

0.114

-0.045

-0.0177

1

MKT-VOLit

-0.0396

0.0425

-0.0024

-0.0072

1

DIS-RATEit

0.0288

-0.033

-0.0191

-0.0128

0.0033

1

SIZEit

0.0667

0.0807

0.1747*

0.1641*

-0.2565***

0.0243

1

SEGit

0.2734***

-0.022

0.0679

-0.0249

0.1595*

-0.116

0.2137**

Panel B: 2008-2009
SEC-GAINit

PRESEC-EARit

INDU-GAINt

ADV-CHAN/RIit

MKT-VOLit

DIS-RATEit

SIZEit

SEC-GAINit

1

PRESEC-EAR it

0.0289

1

INDU-GAINt

0.1161

0.0412

1

ADV-CHAN/RIit

-0.0345

-0.2424***

0.0975

1

MKT-VOLit

0.061

-0.0722

-0.0743

-0.094

1

DIS-RATEit

0.0067

-0.0223

0.0673

0.019

-0.0522

1

SIZEit

0.0958

-0.0029

0.0394

-0.1414

0.3079***

-0.085

1

SEGit

-0.0298

-0.0692

-0.0884

0.0987

0.2484***

-0.056

0.1803**

ADV-CHAN/RIit

MKT-VOLit

DIS-RATEit

Panel C: 2010
SEC-GAINit

PRESEC-EARit

INDU-GAINt

SIZEit

SEC-GAINit

1

PRESEC-EAR it

-0.2161*

1

INDU-GAINt

0.1087

0.3848***

1

ADV-CHAN/RIit

0.4344***

-0.1817

-0.0763

1

MKT-VOLit

-0.0814

-0.0294

0.0995

-0.1637

1

DIS-RATEit

-0.0149

0.0142

-0.0005

-0.4119***

-0.0336

1

SIZEit

0.0039

0.2301*

0.1507

0.0762

0.0804

-0.16

1

SEGit

0.0912

-0.0439

-0.0786

-0.031

0.1831

0.1362

0.1816
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Where:
SEC-GAINit: Securitization gain for firm i at the end of year t is collected from firm’s 10K and it is scaled
by last year’s stockholder equity.
PRESEC-EARit: Earnings before securitization gain for firm i at the end of year t (also is a proxy for
manager incentive for earnings management). All earnings data are collected from companies’ 10Ks filed with the SEC.
INDU-GAINt : Average securitization gain of companies in the same industry at the end of year t deflated
by the stockholders’ equity.
ADV-CHAN/RI it: Adverse change divided by retained interest for firm i at the end of year t used as a
proxy for risk. Adverse change is a measure of volatility in expected future cash flows of
financial assets.
MKT-VOL it: Market volatility for firm i at the end of year t as a proxy for risk.
DIS- RATE it: Discount rate for firm i at the end of year t used in estimation of fair values of assets11.
SIZE it: Natural log of total assets for firm i at the end of year t.
SEG it: Number of operating segments for firm i at the end of year t.

Table 2-3 contains the result of three Logit models. This table shows a significant
positive association between SEC-GAIN and meeting/beating analyst forecasts only for
the 2005-2006 period. This result supports my hypotheses and is consistent with the
findings by Dechow et al. (2010). However, I did not find any indication of earnings
management for the other two periods because the coefficient of SEC-GAIN is not
significant at any acceptably meaningful level. My analysis shows that mortgage
companies and other financial institutions during 2005-2006 were doing extremely well
by generating and selling loans. During this period, many people weren’t familiar with
the securitization process. However, the fall of large banks and financial institutions was
a wake-up call to investors. Consequently, I speculate that managers became more
conservative during the 2008-2009 period. The result for the 2010 period suggests that

11

U.S. companies are required to report the discount rate that they use in fair value
calculation.
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the new revision to SFAS 140, SFAS 166, which changed the criteria for securitization
accounting, has been effective.

Table 2-3
Regression Results for Paper One
(companies following U.S. GAAP – Control based approach)

P (MEETit) = f ( β0 + β1SEC-GAINit + β2 PRESEC-EARit + β3IND-GAINt+ β4 ADVCHAN/RTit + β5 MKT-VOLit + β6DIS-RATEit + β7 SIZEit + β8 SEGit ) … (1-1)
2005-2006
MEETit

Coef

2008-2009

z-value

P>|z|

Coef

2010

z-value

P>|z|

Coef

t-value

P>|t|

SEC-GAINit

1.5553***

2.48

0.013

-0.1126063

-0.18

0.854

-3.32317

-0.88

0.381

PRESEC-EARit

0.2200965

0.46

0.642

0.616486

1.34

0.181

0.606789

1.49

0.142

INDU-GAINt

-0.000414

-0.06

0.951

-0.0055166

-0.11

0.912

0.007691

0.07

0.948

ADV-CHAN/RIit

0.0009092

0.06

0.951

2.223908

0.17

0.869

0.208303

0.05

0.964

MKT-VOLit

-0.4942993

-0.43

0.667

0.2205576

0.27

0.783

3.254642*

1.85

0.071

DIS-RATEit

0.5097591*

1.79

0.073

-0.1521506

-0.47

0.638

0.638787

0.93

0.356

SIZEit

0.0086485

0.47

0.638

0.0456265**

2.14

0.033

0.013958

0.49

0.624

SEGit

-0.0291212

-1.31

0.189

-0.0396732

-1.62

0.104

-0.03824

-1.23

0.226

_cons

0.1836335

0.99

0.323

0.272108

1.38

0.167

0.30561

1.06

0.294

Adj. r-squared:

0.1277**

0.0980

0.0532

(Significance at the levels of 10%, 5%, and 1% are indicated by *, **, and ***)
Where:
MEETit: A dummy variable equal to one when earnings surprises are non-negative and zero otherwise.
Earning surprise is the difference between actual earnings and median analysts’ earnings forecasts
for firm i in year t (Collected from I/B/E/S).
SEC-GAINit: Securitization gain for firm i at the end of year t is collected from firm’s 10K and is scaled by
last year’s stockholder equity.
PRESEC-EARit: Earnings before securitization gain for firm i at the end of year t (also is a proxy for
manager incentive for earnings management). All earnings data are collected from companies’ 10Ks filed with the SEC.
INDU-GAINt : Average securitization gain of companies in the same industry at the end of year t deflated
by the stockholders’ equity.
ADV-CHAN/RI it: Adverse change divided by retained interest for firm i at the end of year t used as a
proxy for risk. Adverse change is a measure of volatility in expected future cash flows of
financial assets.
MKT-VOL it: Market volatility for firm i at the end of year t as a proxy for risk.
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DIS- RATE it: Discount rate for firm i at the end of year t used in estimation of fair values of assets12.
SIZE it: Natural log of total assets for firm i at the end of year t.
SEG it: Number of operating segments for firm i at the end of year t.

Dechow et al. (2010) argue that managers use a discount rate as a tool to manage
earnings when the company retains partial interest in a securitized asset. Since managers
need to use assumptions in calculating the fair value of expected cash flows from the
retained portion, they have some discretion in choosing a suitable discount rate in their
calculations. From the first regression, I found evidence of earnings management using
securitization only during the first period (2005-2006); therefore, I next ran a multivariate
regression on data from 2005-2006 to test whether a discount rate was used for earnings
management. The fair value of the retained interest is calculated as the present value of
the stream of the future cash inflows. The higher the discount rate, the lower the fair
value will be, and vice versa. Prior research concludes that a discount rate is used to
manipulate the fair value of the asset. That is, prior research found a negative association
between securitization gain and discount rate so, consistent with prior studies, I expected
the sign of a discount rate to be significant and negative.
Table 2-4 shows the results of a multivariate regression using panel data that tests
the association between discount rate and securitization. The result shows no any
association between a securitization gain and discount rate, which does not support my
hypothesis and is not consistent with findings by Dechow et al. (2010).

12

U.S. companies are required to report the discount rate that they use in fair value
calculation.
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Table 2-4
Regression Results for Discount Rate as Dependent Variable
(for companies following U.S. GAAP – Control based approach)
DIS-RATEit = β0 + β1SEC-GAINit + β2 PRESEC-EARit + β3INT-SEC-PREit + β4LVRGit + β5SIZEit
+ β6LIQUIDITYit + β7BETAit + β8ROAit + εi
DIS-RATEit

Coef.

z

P>|z|

SEC-GAINit

-0.03643

-0.26

0.791

PRESEC-EAR it

0.001803

0.05

0.963

INT-SEC-PREit

-0.31183

-0.53

0.595

LVRG it

0.001019

0.04

0.971

SIZEit

0.005396

0.79

0.431

LIQUIDITYit

0.014814

0.23

0.818

BETAit

-0.00063

-0.14

0.889

ROAit

9.74E-06

0.1

0.916

_cons

0.093883

1.3

0.192

Adj. R-Squared:

0.0415

(Significance at the levels of 10%, 5%, and 1% are indicated by *, **, and ***)
Where:
DIS- RATE it: Discount rate for firm i at the end of year t used in estimation of fair values of assets13.
SEC-GAINit: Securitization gain for firm i at the end of year t is collected from firm’s 10K and is scaled by
last year’s stockholder equity.
PRESEC-EARit: Earnings before securitization gain for firm i at the end of year t (also is a proxy for
manager incentive for earnings management). All earnings data are collected from companies’ 10Ks filed with the SEC.
INT-SEC-PREit: The interaction variable between securitization gain and earnings before securitization
gain for firm i at the end of year t.
LVRGit: Total liabilities divided by total assets for firm i at the end of year t.
SZE it: Natural log of total assets for firm i at the end of year t.
LIQUIDITYit: Total cash and cash equivalent divided by total assets for firm i at the end of year t.
BETAit: A measure of the systematic risk for firm i in year t (collected from COMPUSTAT).
ROAit: Return on assets for firm i at the end of year t (collected from COMPUSTAT).

My results show the existence of earnings management under U.S. GAAP during
2005-2006, the period before the financial crisis, so I next examine whether there is any
association between securitization gain and meeting/beating earnings forecast for
13

U.S. companies are required to report the discount rate that they use in fair value
calculation.
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companies following IFRS. Tables 2-5 and 2-6 (each consists of data for three different
periods) present the descriptive statistic and correlation matrices for firms following
International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS). Definitions of data are the same as
those provided earlier in this dissertation for companies following U.S. GAAP. As I
mentioned earlier, using the residual analysis, all outliers are detected and removed from
the regression model. In the residual analysis, I ran the original model and calculated the
residual-squared, then plotted the residual-squared against each independent variable to
find outliers. As I also described earlier, after dropping variables that show high bivariate
correlation, my analysis does not suffer from any of the multicollinearity symptoms.

Table 2-5
Descriptive Statistics for Paper One (for companies following IFRS - Risk based approach)
(Year 2007 is the crises year and is excluded from the analyses)
Panel A: 2005-2006
Variable
MEETit
SEC-GAINit

Obs

Mean
80

Std. Dev.
0.5375

25th %tile

75th %tile

Median

Min

Max

0.501738

0

1

1

0

1

0

0.0019531

0.0128746

-0.5931541
0.04053

-0.0572534
0.065125

0.00000
-303.686

0.910598
4.366204

IND-GAINt

74
74

0.022002
-14.2838

0.106325
47.5746

MKT-VOLit

66

0.048073

0.039585

-7.789807
0.0242425

0.00051

0.26875

DISRATEit

64

0.107488

0.03375

0.08925

0.11

0.13

0.03

0.16

SIZEit

74

18.20715

3.317118

15.32291

18.73759

20.02763

12.50103

26.1

0.9347776

0.9573288

LVRGit

74

0.777839

0.298365

0.6806379

0.00000

0.993505

LIQUIDITYit

74

0.048623

0.069203

0.0060965

0.0212892

0.0621536

0.000593

0.282788

ROEit

74

0.687838

2.611719

0.08

0.15

0.19

-0.1

14.94
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Table 2-5
Descriptive Statistics for Paper One (Continued)
Panel B: 2008-2009
Variable
MEETit

Obs
80

0.3625

Std. Dev.
0.483755

SEC-GAINit

78

0.030455

0.179768

IND-GAINt
MKT-VOLit

78
64

-18.5787
0.10723

46.30486
0.075354

DISRATEit

73

0.107658

SIZEit

78

18.65359

LVRGit

78

18.65359

LIQUIDITYit
ROEit

Mean

78
78

0.00013
0.046706

25th %tile

Median

75th %tile

0
0

0
0.000206

1
0.0179769

Min

Max
0

1

0.00000

0.551792

-245.624
0.00068

24.55209
0.31341

-11.3191

-1.150923

-0.0784411

0.035969

0.044645
0.088

0.09527
0.11

0.1592425
0.13

0.025

0.18

3.283764

16.70366

19.36101

20.29982

12.16645

26.4

3.283764

0.8001556

0.9369088

0.9534939

12.16645

26.4

0.019413
0.050908

0.0108583

0.0320459

0.0604727

-0.0225

0.055

0.13

-0.07974
9.39E-05

0.07085
0.24

Panel C: 2010
Variable

Obs

Mean

Std. Dev.

25th %tile

75th %tile

Median

Min

0

0

1

23.19061

0
0.0616094

0.0005991
0.9218992

MEETit
SEC-GAINit

39
38

0.48718
0.018478

0.50637
0.140588

IND-GAINt

38

10.7467

Max

0.0145284
11.57394

0
0.00000

1
0.443686

-5.23691

98.50879

0.074205

0.110185

MKT-VOLit

32

0.077935

0.051869

0.03444

0.00016

0.23027

DISRATEit

37

0.105622

0.033862

0.089

0.11

0.1295

0.025

0.164

SIZEit

38

18.67024

3.353848

16.52661

19.17263

20.81655

12.23658

26.4

0.9330751

0.9540754

LVRGit

38

0.815693

0.252192

0.8068669

0.002057

0.99725

LIQUIDITYit

38

0.044301

0.047555

0.0145737

0.0342155

0.0642847

0.000417

0.251354

ROEit

38

1.884737

12.72118

0.0275

0.07

0.1325

-5.68

77.98

Where:
MEETit: A dummy variable equal to one when earnings surprises are non-negative and zero otherwise.
Earning surprise is the difference between actual earnings and median analysts’ earnings forecasts
for firm i in year t (Collected from I/B/E/S).
SEC-GAINit: Securitization gain for firm i at the end of year t is collected from firm’s 10K and it is scaled
by last year’s stockholder equity.
INDU-GAINt : Average securitization gain of companies in the same industry at the end of year t deflated
by the stockholders’ equity.
MKT-VOL it: Market volatility for firm i at the end of year t as a proxy for risk.
DIS- RATE it: Discount rate for firm i at the end of year t used in estimation of fair values of assets14.
SIZE it: Natural log of total assets for firm i at the end of year t.
LVRGit: Total liability scaled by total assets for firm i at the end of year t.
LIQUIDITYit: Total cash and cash equivalents scaled by total assets for firm i at the end of year t.
ROEit: Return on equity for firm i in year t (collected from COMPUSTAT).

14

U.S. companies are required to report the discount rate that they use in fair value
calculation.
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Table 2-6
Correlation Matrices for Paper One (for companies following IFRS - Risk based approach)
Panel A: 2005-2006
SEC-GAINit

IND-GAINt

MKT-VOLit

DISRATEit

SIZEit

LVRGit

LIQUILIDYit

SEC-GAINit

1

IND-GAINt

0.0455

1

MKT-VOLit

0.1754

-0.067

1

DISRATEit

-0.1788

-0.2105

0.071

1

SIZEit

-0.085

0.3746***

-0.0308

-0.0344

1

LVRGit

-0.2633**

-0.0508

-0.058

0.0096

0.3267***

1

LIQUILIDYit

0.0207

-0.0447

0.0119

0.0264

-0.3172***

-0.2443**

1

ROEit

-0.0179

0.0124

0.0339

0.2734**

-0.0244

0.1172

0.3905***

Panel B: 2008-2009
SEC-GAINit

MKT-VOLit

IND-GAINt

DISRATEit

SIZEit

LVRGit

LIQUILIDYit

SEC-GAINit

1

IND-GAINt

-0.0783

1

MKT-VOLit

-0.0194

-0.1338

1

DISRATEit

0.2783**

0.0136

0.0957

1

SIZEit

-0.1014

0.4713***

-0.1036

-0.009

1

LVRGit

-0.222*

0.3126***

0.1304

-0.0089

0.4181***

1

LIQUILIDYit

0.0342

-0.218

-0.0616

-0.014

-0.0795

-0.2005*

1

ROEit

-0.0221

0.0657

-0.1462

0.305***7

-0.0659

0.1048

-0.127

Panel C: 2010
SEC-GAINit

IND-GAINt

MKT-VOLit

DISRATEit

SIZEit

LVRGit

LIQUILIDYit

SEC-GAINit

1

IND-GAINt

0.2352

1

MKT-VOLit

0.2816

-0.0494

1

DISRATEit

0.2177

0.0098

0.1158

1

SIZEit

0.044

-0.3817**

0.2921

-0.0683

1

LVRGit

0.1464

-0.2039

0.0693

-0.0475

0.446***

1

LIQUILIDYit

-0.0903

-0.0445

-0.0666

-0.1369

-0.1081

-0.3182*

1

ROEit

-0.0351

-0.0709

-0.0296

0.2449

-0.0591

0.101

-0.148

Where:
SEC-GAINit: Securitization gain for firm i at the end of year t is collected from firm’s 10K and is scaled by
last year’s stockholder equity.
INDU-GAINt : Average securitization gain of companies in the same industry at the end of year t deflated
by the stockholders’ equity.
MKT-VOL it: Market volatility for firm i at the end of year t as a proxy for risk.
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DIS- RATE it: Discount rate for firm i at the end of year t used in estimation of fair values of assets15.
SIZE it: Natural log of total assets for firm i at the end of year t.
LVRG it: Total liability scaled by total assets for firm i at the end of year t.
LIQUIDITYit: Total cash and cash equivalents scaled by total assets for firm i at the end of year t.
ROE it: Return on equity for firm i in year t (collected from COMPUSTAT).

Table 2-7 shows the results of three models that test the relationship between
securitization gain and meeting/beating forecast over three timeframes (2005-2006, 20082009, 2010) for companies following IFRS. As the results show, there is no association
between dependent variables and securitization gain. Thus, I cannot support the
hypothesis for companies that follow IFRS because I have not found any evidence of
earnings management. Therefore, my prediction is supported, suggesting that IFRS
criteria for securitization are harder to meet, so the opportunity for earnings management
is lower for companies following IFRS.

15

U.S. companies are required to report the discount rate that they use in fair value
calculation.
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Table 2-7
Regression Results for Paper One (for companies following IFRS - Risk based approach)

P (MEETit) = f ( β0 + β1SEC-GAINit + β2 IND-GAINt+ β3 MKT-VOLit + β4DIS-RATEit
+ Β5SIZEit + β6LVRGit + β7LIQUIDITYit +β8 ROEit )
2005-2006
MEETit

Coef

2008-2009

z-value

P>|z|

Coef

2010

z-value

P>|z|

Coef

t-value

P>|t|

SEC-GAINit

-0.06146

-0.15

0.882

0.5745409

1.34

0.181

0.6169389

1.42

0.163

INDU-GAINt

-0.00132

-0.65

0.512

0.0018842

0.72

0.474

0.002392

0.93

0.358

MKT-VOLit

-1.4978

-1.08

0.279

1.762245*

1.86

0.063

1.793045

1.86

0.069

DIS-RATEit

4.26615

1.5

0.134

0.1583458

0.08

0.937

-0.5050987

-0.22

0.823

SIZEit

0.001483

0.04

0.97

-0.0195633

-0.6

0.55

-0.0250704

-0.79

0.434

LVRGit

-0.2587

-0.81

0.418

0.0053445

0.02

0.984

-0.0596433

-0.23

0.821

LIQUIDITYit

-1.27417

-0.87

0.386

-0.7735758

-0.57

0.569

-0.6754125

-0.5

0.617

ROEit

0.016694

0.71

0.48

0.0048943

0.73

0.463

0.0052923

0.81

0.421

_cons

0.336406

0.39

0.7

0.5798773

0.87

0.385

0.6678149

0.92

0.365

Adj. r-squared:

0.2863

0.2249

0.0437

(Significance at the levels of 10%, 5%, and 1% are indicated by *, **, and ***)
Where:
MEETit: A dummy variable equal to one when earnings surprises are non-negative and zero otherwise.
Earning surprise is the difference between actual earnings and median analysts’ earnings forecasts
for firm i in year t (Collected from I/B/E/S).
SEC-GAINit: Securitization gain for firm i at the end of year t is collected from firm’s 10K and is scaled by
last year’s stockholder equity.
INDU-GAINt : Average securitization gain of companies in the same industry at the end of year t deflated
by the stockholders’ equity.
MKT-VOL it: Market volatility for firm i at the end of year t as a proxy for risk.
DIS- RATE it: Discount rate for firm i at the end of year t used in estimation of fair values of assets16.
SIZE it: Natural log of total assets for firm i at the end of year t.
LVRG it: Total liability scaled by total assets for firm i at the end of year t.
LIQUIDITYit: Total cash and cash equivalents scaled by total assets for firm i at the end of year t.
ROE it: Return on equity for firm i in year t (collected from COMPUSTAT).

16

U.S. companies are required to report the discount rate that they use in fair value
calculation.
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V. CONCLUSIONS
The criteria for securitization differ under U.S. GAAP and IFRS. SFAS 140
(revised by SFAS statement 166 in 2009) is criticized for having easier criteria than IAS
39 set by IFRS. Dechow et al. (2010) used a sample of U.S. firms for the period before
2005 and find evidence of earnings management through securitization.
In this dissertation, I first used all U.S. companies that are engaged in
securitization transactions and test the possibility of earnings management using
securitization. I examine all companies that have completed data for three time periods to
capture changes in the economy and regulations. I find evidence of earnings management
for the period 2005-2006 (before the financial crisis) for companies following U.S.
GAAP. I have found support for one of my hypotheses only; however, my results do not
support the discount-rate hypothesis. That is, my findings show that the discount rate is
not used for manipulating fair value of retained interest. The possible explanation for the
observed positive association between meeting/beating analysts’ forecasts and
securitization gain during 2005-2006 is that, as studies show under SFAS No. 140, the
conditions for sales-accounting securitization was easily met and managers were able to
manage earnings. However, I have not found the same results for 2008-2009 because
during this period, companies were under a lot of scrutiny as they faced financial
difficulties. Under this condition, the opportunity for securitization was low, and
managers became more conservative. For companies following IFRS, as I expected, the
results do not show any evidence of earnings management because the criteria to meet
sales-accounting securitization is harder. The same is true for companies that followed
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U.S. GAAP during the second and third period (2008-2009, 2010). It appears that since
the economic crisis of 2007, managers are under more scrutiny and investigation. In other
words, the opportunity cost of earnings management has become extremely high, and that
is why the occurrence of earnings management has declined during the last few years.
In summary, the results indicate that Statement 166 has reduced the differences
between the GAAP and the IFRS in regard to securitization activities17. This is an
example that shows convergence with IFRS can be beneficial to U.S. investors.

17

In order to reduce the differences between accounting standards set by FASB and ISBA in
regard to financial assets and securitizations activities, FASB, in June of 2009, published
statement no. 166, Accounting for Transfers of Financial Assets, which was a revision to
Statement no. 140, Accounting for Transfers and Servicing of Financial Assets and
Extinguishments of Liabilities. This new standard requires more disclosures on transfer of
financial assets, specifically when firms retain partial interest in the transferred assets, which
consequently exposes the firm to risk. The new regulation has also set new criteria for derecognizing financial assets. Under this statement, “qualifying special-purpose entity” is
eliminated. The Financial statements prepared from the beginning of 2010 should reflect the
impact of the new standard. The new standard influences my papers as well; therefore, I
expanded my data from 2005 to 2010 to show the impact of differences in accounting standards
and the impact of the new standard.
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CHAPTER III
PAPER TWO: SECURITIZATION GAIN, COMPETITIVE
ADVANTAGE AND EARNINGS MANAGEMENT
I. INTRODUCTION
In this paper, I examine whether gain from securitization is the product of
earnings management or the result of a firm’s competitive advantage. Companies sell or
securitize assets to gain several benefits, such as generating capital, transferring risks to a
third party, and improving financial ratios. Securitization can generate gain for several
reasons which I am investigating in this paper using all companies that follow the U.S.
GAAP.
Prior studies provide evidence that managers use accounting for valuation of
retained interest in securitized assets to record gain (Bartov 1993; Karaoglu 2005;
Dechow et al. 2010). Retained interest is the portion of the receivables that the company
is holding and has not yet sold. However, Barth and Taylor (2010, BT hereafter) argue
that a positive income from securitization could be realized because the company has a
competitive advantage in originating financial assets and selling them at a profit.
Therefore, BT suggests that this gain is not necessarily the consequence of earnings
management. BT also suggests that a gain can be realized from cherry-picking, which
means that for the purpose of securitization, managers select assets that have appreciated
most in their values as compared to their historical costs. Karaoglu (2005) finds evidence
that supports the cherry-picking theory suggested by BT.
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Dechow et al. (2010) investigates securitization and earnings smoothing using
flexibility in fair-value accounting for estimating the retained interest in securitized asset
for a sample of American companies. Karaoglu (2005) investigates loan sales and loan
transfer (securitization) and earnings management for a sample of American banks. In my
second paper, consistent with BT’s proposition, I investigate whether the companies that
follow U.S. GAAP and securitize assets realize gain because of their competitive
advantage in creating loans and financial assets or because of management discretion.
Existing studies have focused most on securitization and earnings management by
companies or banks which follow the U.S. GAAP; however, I expand my study to
examine the possible determinants (earnings management vs. competitive advantage) for
the reported gain from securitization.
Asset securitization has significantly changed the field of finance. It improves
liquidity for financial institutions, helps in utilizing capital at its highest level, and opens
more opportunities for investment. Nevertheless, securitization is a complex process and
involves accounting approaches such as fair-value accounting, which is very
controversial (Wallison 2008a & 2008b; Whalen 2008; Forbes 2009;Gaschler 2010;
Skeel 2011). Fair-value accounting is a method of accounting which requires or allows
the users to report assets and liabilities at their market values when preparing financial
statements. However, fair-value accounting rules are complex, flexible, and subject to
user’s discretion when estimating the value of financial instruments. Since asset
securitization has become very important in the financial market, it is important for
investors, standard-setters, lawmakers, auditors, and other players in the market to know
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the way firms use this method for generating capital. The result of this section should
help investors in figuring out whether a firm’s reported securitization gain is a sign of
competitive advantage or of managers’ opportunistic acts.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. First, I offer background and
explanation on some important issues, and then I continue with hypothesis development,
data collection, empirical tests, results, and conclusions.
II. BACKGROUND AND HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT
In this section, I provide information about key components of this study,
including securitization, fair-value accounting, earnings management, and competitive
advantage. I also develop the hypotheses of this study.
Securitization
Securitization is a method of generating cash through which sellers of assets can
transfer part of ownership’s risks and benefits to a third party who is willing or able to
assume the risks. In this process, the interest in a pool of assets is sold to a specialpurpose entity. Adhikari and Betancourt (2008) simply define securitization as “a tool for
financing a pool of assets.”
Before the 1970s, when securitization first started, banks were basically portfolio
lenders, and they would hold onto loans until the loans were paid off. Since the1970s,
securitization has become very common, and companies (financial and non-financial) use
the new approach of pooling together receivables, loans, and other financial assets, and
issuing securities that are backed by the expected cash flows from pooled assets.
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As shown in Figure 1 and discussed earlier, in a simple securitization process, the
selling firm (the transferor of assets) transfers the ownership of a pool of assets to a
special-purpose entity (SPE), which is usually owned by the transferor firm and can be a
trust or corporation. Next, the SPE issues securities backed by the interest in the expected
cash flows from the pooled assets, and transfers proceeds from the sale of securities to the
transferor of assets. A servicing company, usually the transferor firm, collects the cash
flows over the life of the assets and passes it to investors through the special-purpose
entity.
Investors are usually risk-averse; therefore, the securitization transaction is
structured in such a way that the transferred assets are separated from transferor’s other
assets in order to limit the investors’ risk should the transferor faces financial problems.
The limitation in risk increases the investors’ demand for securitized assets. As a result,
firms are able to raise capital with lower costs than in conventional borrowing.
Securitization can benefit the seller in different ways and, because of its benefits, it has
become so important that in the United States alone, more than fifty percent of debt
issued in 2003 was securitized assets1. During the same period, European countries
increased their securitization by about 38 percent2 over the previous year. A single, 1.6
billion-dollar-securitization transaction by a Chinese firm in 2003 also shows that
securitization has become a worldwide financial activity.

1

Source: Bond Market Association (2004)

2

Source: European Securitization Forum (2004)
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Table 3-1 is a summary of the parties involved in securitization, and the possible
benefits and risks affecting each party.

Table 3-1
Parties, Benefits, and Risks Involved in Securitization
Parties Involved

Benefits

Risks involved in securitization
process

Originators of loans

Increase the return on capital
- Lower borrowing costs
- Create additional capital
- Better asset/liability
management

Originator of assets can be in risk
when facing financial difficulties.
As a result, their creditors can go
after the company’s sold assets.

Investors

Securitized assets offers
- Better yields
- Increase market liquidity
- Better protection
- Flexible payment stream which
best suits the investors

Moral Hazard:
Management can cherry-pick the
assets that have a bad repayment
history.
Complexity:
The complexity of accounting for
securitization reduces the
transparency; therefore, this
makes the prediction and analysis
of security performance very
difficult.
Valuation:
Valuation of securities for which
market value is not available.

Borrowers

Increase availability of credits

Securitization can be structured as secured borrowing or as a sales transaction.
Managers prefer the sales transaction because it allows them to eliminate the sold assets
from their balance sheet and recognize a gain/loss which is equal to the difference
between the book value and sale price of the assets. However, in the case of secured
borrowing, the asset is not removed from the balance sheet, and the liability is increased
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by the amount of cash received for the assets. The problem with secured borrowing is the
increase in the firm’s leverage, which is not desirable. Niu and Richardson (2006) show
that the leverage ratio of a sample of American firms would have been significantly
higher if the transferors had accounted their sale of assets as secured borrowing.
Nevertheless, the accounting for securitization is not simple, and it becomes more
complicated when it is not clear whether transaction is treated as a secured borrowing or
a sales transaction.
Both types of securitization (secured borrowing and sale) have great impact on
financial statements. Firms can sell any asset that generates cash flow, from the most
common one, which is trade receivables, to other kinds of assets, such as automobile and
mortgage loans, and receivables from credit cards.
Fair-Value Accounting
Fair-value accounting basically means reporting assets and liabilities at their fair
values. Determining the market price of some assets is difficult, specifically when a
country is going through economic and financial crises, and the market value of some
assets are not available. As a result, the fair value of assets has to be subjectively
estimated. Therefore, critics blame fair-value accounting for the recent financial crisis.
They argue that in these situations, models based on subjective estimation are used for
assessing the fair value of assets whose active market prices are not available (Laux and
Leuz 2009). Byrne et al. (2008) find evidence that managers implement fair-value
accounting with different levels of conservatism. Other studies also show that
unobservable or unavailable values result in estimation of fair values which are subject to

59

estimation errors (Barth and Landsman 1995). Fiechter and Meyer (2009) use a sample of
552 U.S. companies and investigate the association between measurement of fair-value
accounting and earnings management. They find that managers in their sample firms use
the complexity of fair-value measurement for managing earnings. Another study by Ryan
(2008) also provides evidence showing that when market prices for some liquid assets are
not available, estimation of fair value can be open to earnings manipulation.
Earnings Management
Prior studies show many reasons for managers to manage earnings. Income
smoothing (Bartov 1993; Graham et al 2005), components of compensation (Shrieves and
Gao 2002; Bergstresser and Philippon 2006; Shuto 2007), the IPO process (Teoh et al.
1998; Li et al. 2006), loan covenant (Bartov 1993; El-Mahdy 2010), and beating or
meeting analysts’ earnings forecasts (Athanasakou et al. 2009; Abarbanell and Lehavy
2003) are some factors which motivate discretionary decisions. However, factors which
encourage earnings management are not the focus of this paper, and my goal is to show
that managers use fair-value accounting estimation of retained interest in securitized
assets to show gains in order to meet analysts’ forecasts.
Historical cost accounting requires assets to be recognized at their acquisition
costs when purchased, and any appreciation in the value of asset is not recognized unless
the ownership of the asset is transferred to another party. When a firm sells assets,
managers can take advantage of historical accounting rules to record the gain in two
ways. Managers can cherry-pick those assets with the greatest difference between their
historical costs and market fair values to obtain a higher gain. Or, managers can achieve
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desirable gains by taking advantage of the flexibility entangled with the fair-value
accounting estimation of retained interests in the securitized assets (Dechow et al. 2010).
Consolidation and de-recognition are the two issues essential to accounting for
securitizations, of which the latter is related to our study. When the securitized asset is
removed from transferor’s books, and the transferor’s involvement in the asset is stopped,
the accounting and de-recognition is simple. However, accounting for securitization
becomes complicated when the transferor stays involved with the sold assets “either in
the form of servicing, recourse, or retention of some of the cash flows” (Adhikari and
Betancourt 2008, 77).
In situations where the transferor keeps partial interest in the pooled assets, and
the market value of the retained portion of assets is not available, the fair-market value of
the retained interest has to be estimated. This estimation is usually based on private
information and the discretion of managers.
Competitive Advantage
Porter (1985) was the first to promote low-cost or differentiation strategies as a
way for firms to achieve competitive advantage. Barney (1996) defines competitive
advantage as a strategy which creates value and is dominated by one firm, where
competitors cannot imitate the strategy easily. Firms can achieve competitive advantage
through a well-designed strategy (e.g. differentiation) or through the possession of
rare/unique resources. Using either method, firms can improve performance and offer
better-quality services which, in turn, win customers’ loyalty. Kulatunga (2007) argues
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that firms can gain competitive advantage by jointly using their distinguished skills and
rare resources.
As mentioned before, studies showed evidence of earnings management using
fair-value accounting through securitization. Barth and Taylor (2010) defend fair-value
accounting by arguing that securitization gain could be the result of companies’
competitive advantage over unique resources or activities. In this dissertation, I control
for the companies’ competitive advantage and examine the earnings management in
relation to securitization. Therefore, I control for components of firms’ competitive
advantage and investigate the claim made by Dechow et al., which states that managers
use fair-value accounting rules to manage earnings. Thus I hypothesize:
H1: For companies that follow U.S. GAAP (risk-based approach), there is a positive
association between securitization gain and meeting or beating financial analysts’
forecasts after controlling for the components of competitive advantage.
III. DATA COLLECTION AND METHODOLOGY
This section discusses the data collection and methodology used in this study.
Data Collection
I used LexisNexis and several keywords to find companies in the U.S. that used
securitization transactions during the periods 2005 -2006 and 2008-2010, and have
almost all of the related data. I have come up with a total of 355 company-year
observations for 71 companies that follow the U.S. GAAP. Dechow et al. (2010) made a
similar study in the period between 2000 and 2005 and collected a total of 96 companies.
Given that the size of securitization activities has declined significantly since the 20002005 period, I believe the chance that I have missed any company engaged in
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securitization activities and not on my list is extremely low. I use “securitisation”,
“securitization”, “financial asset”, “receivable” and many more key terms to find
companies with securitization activities. I went through companies’ annual financial
reports (10-K) and hand-collected the securitization data. LexisNexis and Google Finance
were extremely helpful in finding companies’ financial reports, stock information, email
addresses, and phone numbers. In addition, I used : a) the Research Insights
(COMPUSTAT) database to collect the financial data, b) The Center for Research in
Security Prices (CRSP) database to collect monthly stock returns and stock prices, c) the
SEC’s Edgar database to look at companies’ 10-K reports, d) the Institutional Brokers’
Estimate System (I/B/E/S) to collect analysts’ earnings and return forecasts, and e) LexisNexis and other online sources.
Methodology
Shareholders of companies with competitive advantage in their fields enjoy higher
benefits and values, which should increase their return on capital more than their cost of
capital. Consequently, following Gjerde et al. (2010), from here on GKS, I use the
following equation to calculate competitive advantage:

CA = ir – k

… (2-1)

Where:
CA is competitive advantage, ir is the internal rate of return on invested capital, and k is
the corresponding cost of capital.
Companies with positive CA (return on capital is higher than risk-adjusted cost of
capital) have a competitive advantage, which means that some of their activities are
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creating more value. GKS take their calculations one step further to examine whether a
company’s source of competitive advantage is industry-based or resource-based.
Therefore, they modify equation (1) as follows:

CAit = (irIt - kIt) + (irit – irIt) + (kIt - kit)

… (2-2)

Where:
CAIB = (irIt - kIt) represents the industry-based competitive advantage, and is the difference
between the industry’s average return on capital, irIt and the industry’s average cost of
capital. A positive CAIB indicates that the industry is earning an average return higher
than its average cost of capital. The industry’s competitive advantage results from a
superior advantage, such as barriers to entry.
CA RB = ( irit - irIt ) + ( kIt - kit ) represents the resource-based competitive
advantage. It is the sum of RED RB = ( irit - irIt ), the difference between the firm’s return
and the industry’s average return, and the resource-based competitive advantage: RID RB
= ( kIt - kit ), the difference between the industry average cost of capital and the firm’s
cost of capital. A positive RED RB shows that, on average, the company is making higher
returns than the industry, which could be a result of unique resources or a unique ability
specific to that company. For example, a company may be able to generate loans better
than its rivals in the industry. GKF view this variable as a risk-based advantage and
suggest that both components of resource-based advantage be used since risk cannot
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separated from return3. Following GKF, I use the annual accounting return on equity as a
proxy for ir, which is the earnings divided by the book value of the stockholders’ equity.
Cost of Capital
In prior studies, many methods were used to estimate the cost of capital. Scholars
have criticized the cost-of-capital models for not providing firm-specific estimates, and
also for the lack of empirical validity (Easton 2006). Jain (2005) uses eight different
models to investigate the association between the cost of capital and electronic trading
and finds different results. In another study, Dhaliwal et al. (2006) use accounting-based
models to estimate the cost of capital. They examine the impact of corporate and personal
tax on the association between the cost of capital and a company’s leverage. Easton and
Monahan (2005) use seven accounting-based models to estimate the cost of capital and
test the validity of these models. Their results show that none of the estimated cost-ofcapital models is reliable.
Nevertheless, even though all cost-of-capital models are criticized, they are
widely used in practice and in empirical research. Therefore, for estimating the cost of
capital, k, I adopt the following model from Easton et al. (2002), which is a variation of
the residual income valuation model.

3

A positive return difference could be the result of a firm’s high-risk assets.
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Pit  bpsit 

Et [(ROEit 1  ki )  bpsit ]
( ki  g i )

… (2-3)

Where:
Pit : Price per share
bpsit : Book value per share
ROEit+1 : Return on equity (4 year expected cumulative dividend earnings per share after
date t)
git : Growth rate (expected rate of growth in residual income)
kit : Expected cost of capital
I have used the following model to test my hypothesis for different time periods,
running the model three times - once for the period before the financial crisis (20052006), once for the period after the crisis (2008-2009), and lastly, once for 2010, in which
the new Standard regarding securitization was issued4. The positive sign of the
coefficient of MEET supports my hypothesis.

SEC-GAINit = β0 + β1MEETit + β2 CAIB, it+ β3REDRB, jt + β4RIDRB, jt + β5PRESEC-EARjt
+ β6SIZEit + β7LIQUDITYit + Β8BETAit + β9ROAit + εj
…(2-4)
Where:
SEC-GAINit: The gain from securitization obtained from companies’ 10-K filing with the
SEC for firm i in year t.

4

Financial reports for 2010 reflect the impact of SFAS 166.
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MEETit: Equal to one when there is a non-negative earnings surprise and zero otherwise.5
CAIB, it = (irIt - kIt): The industry-based competitive advantage.
RED RB, it = ( irit - irIt ): The difference between the firm’s return and the industry’s
average return.
RID RB, it = ( kIt - kit ): The difference between the industry’s average cost of capital and
the firm’s cost of capital.
PRESEC-EARit: Earnings before securitization gain for firm i in year t (also is a proxy
for manager incentive for earnings management). All earnings data are collected
from companies’ 10-Ks filed with the SEC.
SIZEit: Natural log of total assets for firm i in year t.
LIQUIDITYit: Total cash and cash equivalent scaled by total assets for firm i in year t.
BETAit: Market-specific risk for firm i in year t.
ROAit: Return on assets for firm i in year t.
IV. RESULTS
Table 3-2 represents the descriptive statistics for the variables used in regression
analysis. The three panels of this table contain the information for the three periods used
in the study (2005-2006, 2008-2009, 2010). I have divided my study into three periods to
better capture the effects of changes in the economy and market. I consider 2007 to be the
main period of crisis. The first period (2005-2006) covers the period before financial
crisis, the second period (2008-2009) reflects the period after the financial crisis, and

5

Earnings surprise is calculated as the difference between actual earnings and mean preannouncement forecast.
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finally the last period (2010) should show the impact of the new regulation for
securitization. My study consists of 71 companies from 5 different industries with a total
of 355 company-year observations. Securitization gains, pre-securitization earnings, and
industry securitization gains are scaled by prior-year equity. Other control variables, such
as liquidity and capital expenditures, are scaled by total assets. Using residual analysis,
all outliers are detected and removed from the regression model. In the residual analysis,
I ran the original model and calculated the residual-squared, then plotted the residualsquared against each independent variable to find outliers, which are eliminated from the
analysis.

Table 3-2
Descriptive Statistics for Paper Two (companies following U.S. GAAP)
(Year 2007 is the crises year and is excluded from the analyses)
Panel A: 2005-2006
Variable

Obs.

Mean

Std. Dev.

25th %tile

75th %tile

Min.

Max.

0.00024

0.12204

0.830171

0

1

0

1

6.22

6.59

1.53

11.9

-63.58

69.43

Median
0

SEC-GAIN it

142

0.009612

0.073007

MEET it

142

0.253521

0.436567

0

8.45E-07

CAIB, it

130

6.683923

2.047742

6.14

REDRB, it

130

-0.10554

12.76548

-4.0975

-1.01

2.9975

RIDRB, it

130

7.69E-05

3.261971

-2.04

0.08

1.955

-14.02

7.31

PRESEC-EAR it

142

0.019833

0.171974

-0.0000822

1.60E-06

0.000306

-0.59739

1.599352

SIZE it

126

9.229762

2.565112

7.5475

8.965

10.78

1.97

14.45

BETA it

103

0.881825

0.810627

0.409

0.821

1.372

-4.175

2.82

LIQUIDITY it

126

0.087852

0.339538

0.0102777

0.023939

0.055696

0.00000

3.570135
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Table 3-2
Descriptive Statistics for Paper Two (Continued)
Panel B: 2008-2009
Variable

Observation

SEC-GAIN it

142

MEET it

142

CAIB, it

130

REDRB,it

130

RIDRB, it

130

Mean

Std. Dev.

142

Median

75th %tile

Min.
0.0000

Max.

0.093198

0

0.0002059

0.0102173

0.542254

0.499975

0

1

1

0

1

2.808385

7.73002

-3.01

-2.13

6.06

-3.01

20.66

0.001923

18.62295

-6.38

-0.45

7.095

-79.84

77.46

3.911702

-2.22

0.5

2.7225

-15.85

7.24

-0.000227

0.000056

0.449393

0.010081

-1.67161

4.918738

8.966519

11.0027

0.018526

-0.00077

PRESEC-EAR
it

25th %tile

0.015754

0.490933

SIZEitit

124

9.244106

2.669727

7.290797

3.619851

14.6145

BETA it

126

1.543659

2.602721

0.647

1.228

1.822

-0.664

28.652

LIQUIDITY it

124

0.079873

0.206706

0.012406

0.026796

0.073368

0.00000

2.031702

90

0.381145

11.35542

-0.40725

0.737

4.09225

-71.658

17.307

ROAit

Panel C: 2010
Variable

Observation

Mean

25th
%tile

Std. Dev.

0

Median

75th
%tile

0.000014

Min.

Max.

0.00031

0.003944

0.170963

0

1

SEC-GAIN it

71

0.006407

0.025225

MEET it

71

0.577465

0.497479

0

1

1

-1.45

2.89

CAIB, it

65

4.031384

12.08958

-1.54

-1.45

40.46

REDRB, it

65

-0.00031

29.60198

-3.675

1.8

7.09

-87.15

169.14

RIDRB, it

65

0.001538

3.756628

-2.395

0.37

2.39

-12.48

7.8

-0.00006

0.000042

0.060571
-0.170963

0.964404

7.408278

9.15173

11.06695

3.633922

14.63305

1.086

1.812

4.8375

-0.884

245.746

PRESECEAR it

71

SIZE it
ROAit

59
49

0.068115
9.330365
8.863857

0.186212
2.721738
34.90148

Where:
SEC-GAINit: Gain from securitization obtained from company’s 10-K filing with the SEC for firm i in year
t.
MEETit: Equal to one when there is non-negative earnings surprise and zero otherwise.6
CAIB, it = (irIt - kIt): The industry-based competitive advantage.
RED RB, it = ( irit - irIt ): Difference between the firm’s return and the industry’s average return.
RID RB, it = ( kIt - kit ): Difference between the industry’s average cost of capital and the firm’s cost of
capital.
PRESEC-EARit: Earnings before securitization gain for firm i in year t (also is a proxy for manager
incentive for earnings management). All earnings data are collected from companies’ 10-Ks filed with the
SEC.
SIZEit: Natural log of total assets for firm i in year t.
6

Earnings surprise is calculated as the difference between actual earnings and mean preannouncement forecast.
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BETAit: Market-specific risk for firm i in year t.
LIQUIDITYit: Total cash and cash equivalent scaled by total assets for firm i in year t.
ROAit: Return on assets for firm i in year t.

Table 3-3 is presented in three panels to show the correlation matrices for
companies from three time periods. As indicated in this table, some of the variables have
significant (indicated by * as marginally significant or p-value between 0.05 and 0.1, **
as significant or p-value between .01 and 0.05, and *** as highly significant or p-value
less than 0.01) relationship with each other; however, none of the correlations are of high
magnitude7. The common rule of thumb for identifying multicollinearity is a variance
inflation factor (VIF) of 10 or more, or a tolerance of 0.1 or less. Another way is to
examine the bivariate correlations between independent variables and look for correlation
of 0.7 or higher. Lastly, muticollinearity may be present when the overall model is
significant but none of the independent variables are significant. After dropping variables
that show a high bivariate correlation, my analysis does not show any of the above
symptoms.

7

As a rule of thumb, there is a serious correlation between two variables when the magnitude
of correlation is higher than .7.
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Table 3-3
Correlation Matrices for Paper Two (companies following U.S. GAAP)
Panel A: period 2005-2006.
Variable

MEETit

MEETit

1

CAIB, it

-0.079

1

REDRB, it

0.0872

0.0023

1

RIDRB, it

0.0279

0.0000

-0.1957*

1

PRESECEARit

-0.041

-0.034

0.0485

-0.049

1

SIZEit

0.1396

-0.1842**

0.3573***

0.0321

0.0807

1

BETAit

0.0995

0.1124

0.4489***

0.005

-0.0139

0.3724***

1

LIQUIDITYit

0.1268

0.0873

-0.0033

-0.095

0.0399

-0.2447***

-0.1031

CAIB, it

REDRB, it

RIDRB, it

PRESEC-EARit

SIZEit

BETAit

Panel B: period 2008-2009.
Variable

MEETit

MEETit

1

CAIB, it

-0.2634***

1

REDRB, it

-0.018

-0.0001

1

RIDRB, it

-0.0583

0.0001

0.1157

1

PRESEC-EARit

0.0841

-0.066

0.0056

-0.046

1

SIZEit

0.2227**

-0.3683***

0.1254

0.1623*

-0.0029

1

BETAit

0.0785

-0.0762

0.0327

0.1534*

0.0181

0.0831

1

LIQUIDITYit

0.1542*

0.1061

0.1088

-0.045

-0.0349

-0.1957**

-0.01

1

ROAit

0.015

0.1323

0.2358

0.0808

-0.0299

0.0527

-0.103

0.186*

CAIB, it

REDRB, it

RIDRB, it
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PRESEC-EARit

SIZEit

BETAit

LIQUIDITYit

Table 3-3
Correlation Matrices for Paper Two (Continued)
Panel C: period 2010.
Variable

MEETit

MEETit

1

CAIB, it

-0.132

1

REDRB, it

-0.118

0

1

RIDRB, it

0.0434

0

-0.04

1

PRESEC-EARit

0.1509

-0.1135

0.1003

-0.0979

1

SIZEit

0.1603

-0.1868

0.119

0.2602**

0.2301*

1

ROAit

0.089

-0.0827

0.1101

-0.1593

0.2013

0.2102

CAIB, it

REDRB, it

RIDRB, it

PRESEC-EARit

SIZEit

Note:
1- Pearson correlation is reported in the above tables. Significance at the levels of 10%, 5%,
and 1% are represented by *, **, and ***.
2- To test for multicollinearity among variables, the Variance Inflation Index was used and
no serious correlation was detected.
Where:
MEETit: Equal to one when there is non-negative earnings surprise and zero otherwise.8
CAIB, it = (irIt - kIt): The industry-based competitive advantage.
RED RB, it = ( irit - irIt ): Difference between the firm’s return and the industry’s average return.
RID RB, it = ( kIt - kit ): Difference between the industry’s average cost of capital and the firm’s cost of
capital.
PRESEC-EARit: Earnings before securitization gain for firm i in year t (also is a proxy for manager
incentive for earnings management). All earnings data are collected from companies’ 10-Ks filed with the
SEC.
SIZEit: Natural log of total assets for firm i in year t.
BETAit: Market-specific risk for firm i in year t.
LIQUIDITYit: Total cash and cash equivalent scaled by total assets for firm i in year t.
ROAit: Return on assets for firm i in year t.

Table 3-4 is a summary of regression analyses for the three time periods. For the
first two periods, I used multivariate-panel data-regression models to examine whether

8

Earnings surprise is calculated as the difference between actual earnings and mean preannouncement forecast.
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companies reporting gain from securitization activities are likely to have manipulated
earnings, or if any relationship exists between their competitive advantage variables and
the securitization gain.
The results for period 2005-2006 indicate: 1) a strong positive association
between securitization gain and meeting/beating earnings forecasts, which supports the
hypothesis of this dissertation; 2) on the other hand, a highly significant negative
association between PRESEC-EAR (proxy for manager’s motivation for earnings
management)9 and securitization gain. Taken together, the overall results for 2005-2006
(the period when mortgage companies and financial institutions were strong in generating
loans and selling them) support my hypothesis and are consistent with findings by
Dechow et al (2010). The significant negative coefficient of PRESEC-EAR shows that
managers had the motivation and opportunity to sell loans and earn positive income.
The second part of Table 3-4 represents the results for the period 2008-2009. As
indicated in the table, there is no significant association between securitization gain, the
dependent variable, and MEET, which indicates that securitization gain during this period
(after the crisis) was not associated with earnings management. My interpretation of this
result is that companies were under more scrutiny after the crisis and also, because of the
problems with the mortgage companies, the number and magnitude of securitization
activities had dropped significantly. However, the result shows significant negative
association between one of two components of competitive advantage and SEC-GAIN.

9

PRESEC-EAR is net income before the gain from securitization; therefore, when PRESECEAR is low or negative, managers might be motivated to manage earnings.
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This result points out that competitive advantage could adversely affect securitization
activities. The result also shows significant negative association between PRESEC-EAR
and securitization gain, which means that managers still had the motivation to manage
earnings. This finding is consistent with the severe economic crisis in the economy.
The last three columns of the table present results for 2010, in which a new
standard, SFAS 166, was implemented. This change is expected to be reflected in
companies’ annual reports. My explanation for not having any significant relationship
between meeting/beating forecast and SEC_GAIN during this period is that under the
new standard, it is harder for companies to meet the conditions for sale accounting.
Furthermore, the secured borrowing increases the amount of leverage on financial
statements, which is generally not desirable. Nevertheless, my results do not show any
association between the components of competitive advantage and securitization gain.
This indicates that companies’ competitive advantage is not responsible for securitization
gain during this period. I should note that the explanatory power of the model in the first
two periods is high (R-squared of 0.45 and 0.61, respectively), but it is low in the last
period (R-squared of 0.01). The low explanatory power of the model in the third period
can be attributed to its observations that are limited to only one year (2010).
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Table 3-4
Regression Results for Paper Two (for companies following U.S. GAAP)

SEC-GAINit = β0 + β1MEETit + β2 CAIB, it+ β3REDRB, jt + β4RIDRB, jt +
β5PRESEC-EARjt + β6SIZEit + β7LIQUDITYit + Β8BETAit + β9ROAit + εj
2005-2006
SEC-GAINit

Coef

2008-2009

z-value

P>|z|

Coef

2010

z-value

P>|z|

Coef

t-value

P>|t|

MEETit

0.0335847***

3.16

0.002

0.0002844

0.14

0.893

0.0017131

0.43

0.671

CAIB, it

0.0016206

0.65

0.516

-0.001530***

-4.29

0.000

-0.0001058

-0.59

0.561

REDRB, it

0.0005315

0.74

0.459

0.0000439

0.84

0.404

0.0000504

0.61

0.547

RIDRB, it

-0.0021454

-1.27

0.203

-0.0001185

-0.48

0.632

-0.0004267

-0.87

0.392

PRESEC-EARit

-0.350433***

-4.96

0.000

-0.975104***

-63.94

0.000

-0.0100657

-0.99

0.329

SIZEit

0.0048983

0.97

0.332

0.0004201

0.98

0.327

0.0006031

0.69

0.492

LIQUDITYit

-0.1612803**

-2.52

0.012

-0.0092278**

-2.14

0.032

-

-

-

BETAit

-0.0036547

-0.35

0.729

-0.0000203

-0.07

0.946

-

-

-

ROAit

-0.0000373

-0.34

0.733

-0.00000165

-0.02

0.986

-0.000027

-0.56

0.58

Cons.

-0.0337832

-0.58

0.565

0.0282041***

3.32

0.001

-0.002533

-0.28

0.78

Adj. r-squared:

0.4548 ***

0.6131***

0.0107

(Note: Significance at the levels of 10%, 5%, and 1% are indicated by *, **, and ***.)
Where:
SEC-GAINit: The gain from securitization obtained from company’s 10-K filing with the SEC for firm i in
year t.
MEETit: Equal to one when there is non-negative earnings surprise and zero otherwise.10
CAIB, it= (irIt - kIt): The industry-based competitive advantage.
RED RB, it = ( irit - irIt ): Difference between the firm’s return and the industry’s average return.
RID RB, it = ( kIt - kit ): Difference between the industry’s average cost of capital and the firm’s cost of
capital.
PRESEC-EARit: Earnings before securitization gain for firm i in year t (also is a proxy for manager
incentive for earnings management). All earnings data are collected from companies’ 10-Ks filed with the
SEC.
SIZEit: Natural log of total assets for firm i in year t.
LIQUIDITYit: Total cash and cash equivalent scaled by total assets for firm i in year t.
BETAit: Market-specific risk for firm i in year t.
ROAit: Return on assets for firm i in year t.
10

Earnings surprise is calculated as the difference between actual earnings and mean preannouncement forecast.
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V. CONCLUSIONS
Securitization is a new concept and practice, and many individuals are not
familiar with its complicated process. Securitization has become a popular method of
financing over the past few decades. Nevertheless, prior studies show that the accounting
standards related to securitization (e.g. fair-value accounting) can be misused by
managers to smooth, time, or manipulate earnings (Karaoglu 2005; Hunton et al. 2006;
Dechow et al. 2010). Barth and Taylor (2010) suggest that gain from securitization could
also be a result of the company’s competitive advantage, from a special ability or a
unique resource.
I have used all companies that reported securitization gain during 2005-2006
(before the financial crisis), 2008-2009 (after the crisis), and 2010 (when financial
statements reflected the impact of SFAS 16611). That is, my study consists of 355 firmyear observations. The result of regression analysis shows that there is a significant
association between meeting/beating earnings forecast and securitization gain during the
period before the crisis. However, there is no positive relationship between securitization
gain and competitive advantage for any time period. Also, there is no indication of
earnings management for the period 2008-2010. It is argued, but it has not yet been
proven, that companies have become more conservative since the issuance of SFAS 166.
I believe that after the crisis year of 2007, companies were under more scrutiny,
and also mortgage companies were facing many challenges, so the number and

11

The criteria for securitization transaction under SFAS 140 are criticized for being too easy
to be met sales condition (Niu and Richardson 2004).
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magnitude of securitization activities dropped significantly. However, the result shows
significant negative association between one of two components of competitive
advantage and SEC-GAIN. This result points out that competitive advantage could
adversely affect securitization activities. The result also shows significant negative
association between PRESEC-EAR and securitization gain, which means that managers
still had the motivation to manage earnings. This finding is consistent with the severe
economic crisis. I also show that after FASB Statement 166 became effective at the
beginning of 2010, it became harder for companies to meet the conditions for sale
accounting, so the opportunity for earnings management declined. Lastly, I show that a
company’s competitive advantage is not responsible for securitization gain during this
period.
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CHAPTER IV
PAPER THREE: SECURITIZATION, INVESTORS’
PROTECTION AND VALUE RELEVANCE
I. INTRODUCTION
In this part of my dissertation, I first investigate the impact of securitization gain
on the value-relevance of accounting information. My next focus is on earnings
management through securitization transactions by companies operating in different
countries with a variety of laws and law enforcement regimes that follow International
Financial Reporting Standard (IFRS). European regulators have required the companies
operating in the European Union countries to adopt the IFRS since the beginning of 2005.
The main objectives of this paper are to examine the market relevance of an accounting
performance measure, return on equity, for companies that are engaged in securitization
transactions, as well as to investigate the dual impacts of different legal systems and
levels of investor protection on earnings management using asset securitization .
Securitization is a fast and easy approach for generating cash and transferring the
risk of holding assets to a third party. Securitization occurs in different areas, from
corporate loans, home loans, and personal loans to store credit cards, auto leases, and
even song royalties. in many ways, securitization benefits a company. However, because
of the complexity of issues and accounting standards related to securitization, problems
may arise from the securitization process. Prior studies show that managers can use their
discretion to increase gain through asset securitization (Hunton et al. 2006; Dechow et al.
2010).
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Jenson and Meckling (1976) define:
“…an agency relationship as a contract under which one or more
persons (the principal(s)) engage another person (the agent) to
perform some service on their behalf which involves delegating
some decision making authority to the agent. If both parties to the
relationship are utility maximizers, there is good reason to believe
that the agent will not always act in the best interests of the
principal.”
Based on the Agency theory, investors usually have little faith in management.
Therefore, investors do not place high value on managers’ decisions, particularly when
those decisions involve complex processes and ambiguous outcomes.
One of the accounting methods related to the securitization process that can give
discretion to managers is fair-value accounting, which involves the estimation of
unobservable asset values (Dechow et al. 2009). Fair-value accounting rules have been
criticized for their complexity and vagueness, which could result in estimation errors or
in earnings management (Barth and Landsman 1995; Fiechter and Meyer 2009; Zhou
2009).
In addition to problems with fair-value accounting, securitization transactions
may have varying results in different countries because of factors such as differing
accounting standards, legal systems, and levels of investor protection. The complexity
tangled with accounting for securitization, and the differences in accounting standards
and legal systems, make the resulting financial reports harder to compare across countries
(Paananen 2009). Therefore, this topic is very important to participants in international
markets. Investors, creditors, suppliers, audit firms, standard-setters, and policy-makers
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are all interested in the quality of financial reports and whether financial reports represent
the true picture of a firm’s performance and financial position.
In this paper, I examine the value-relevance of securitization gain for companies
that follow the U.S. GAAP, are engaged in securitization transaction, and have complete
data for 2005-2006 and 2008-2010. Then I investigate the effects of different levels of
investor protection on earnings management, using asset securitization for companies that
follow IFRS, are engaged in securitization, and have complete data for 2005-2006 and
2008-2010. I expect to contribute to the literature by: 1) showing the impact of asset
securitization on the value-relevance of return on equity (ROE) as a measure of
accounting performance and 2) showing that countries with stronger investor protection
experience less earnings management using securitization gain. The results of this study
can be used by standard-setters and policy-makers when evaluating the standards and
rules related to asset securitization.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. First, I offer background and
explanation on some important issues and then continue with hypothesis development,
data collection, empirical tests, results, and conclusions.
II. BACKGROUND AND HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT
Value Relevance
Securitization became a popular method of financing during the past few decades,
and already by the end of the first quarter of 2007 there were 8.9 trillion dollars in assetbacked securities outstanding (Bond Market Association). The securitization process is
very complex, and most people did not hear about it until the fall of mortgage and
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financial institutions. The complexity of securitization transaction is due to its
involvement with different accounting standards (e.g. fair-value accounting) and legal
issues (relating to bankruptcy, tax, securities, and financial).
As I mentioned before, companies securitize a variety of assets, from credit-card
receivables to mortgage loans, auto loan, and trade receivables. Prior studies show that
investors are unable to easily value these types of assets (Berlin and Loeys 1988;
Diamond 1989). Other studies claim and show that investors grant higher value to
earnings when earnings exclude the securitization gain (e.g., Niu & Richardson 2006).
In this dissertation, I argue that the complexity of securitization transaction caused
by the complexity of fair-value accounting increases information asymmetry and
disagreement between investors and management, and hence decreases the valuerelevance of accounting performance measures. Therefore, I hypothesize that:
H1: Securitization gain decreases the value-relevance of accounting performance
measures in term of return on equity.
Investor protection
Securitization originated when a government-sponsored entity, the Government
National Mortgage Association, known as “Ginnie Mae”, started selling mortgagebacked securities in 1970 (Senterfitt 2006). A very common practice for most companies
is to sell their receivables. Before the rise of the recent financial crisis, this practice was
very popular, and firms used securitization to generate cash in order to lend to new
customers. Beside the differences in accounting standards across countries, securitization
transactions are also affected by the legal system of each country.
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Currently, 117 countries with different legal systems and different levels of
investor protection require or allow their firms to follow IFRS (Chadha 2010). Therefore,
in this paper, I use companies that are engaged in asset securitization transactions, follow
IFRS, and operate under different levels of investor protection, and investigate the
earnings management using the assets securitization process. The issue of interest is
whether strengthening investor protection can increase the quality of financial reports
through reduced earnings management for adopters of IFRS. Prior studies show that
firms in countries with a high level of investor protection are better valued (La Porta et al.
2002).
Investors are generally willing to pay more for financial assets when they face
lower risk and feel their investments are better protected by laws. La Porta et al. (2000)
claim and show that the quality of corporate governance in a country depends on the level
of investor protection, and study shows that larger companies offer more information in
countries with a high level of investor protection (Paananen 2009). La Porta et al. (1997)
examine capital markets in 49 countries and find that countries with a lower level of
investor protection have smaller equity and debt markets. Therefore, the size and the
health of a country’s capital market depend on regulations and the enforcement of those
laws and regulations (La Porta et al. 1997). As an example, investors in Italy, Germany,
and France are not as well-protected by strong legal systems as are investors in the
United States (Hung 2001).
Basically, the legal systems of countries around the world can be grouped based
on their origins, and we can categorize the commercial laws into common law, with
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origins in English law, and civil laws, which were based on Roman law. Leuz et al.
(2003) groups countries into three categories based on their similarities in legal and
institutional features. This classification is similar to La Porta et al. (1997), who grouped
countries into code-law and common-law. Basically, scholars focus on the background
and development of legal systems and the source of regulations among other issues to
group countries into two major categories, common law and civil-law countries. Civillaw generated from Roman law and depends heavily on scholars’ development of
regulations and codes.
Three families of laws are recognized in the civil tradition: French, German, and
Scandinavian. The French family was started in France under Napoleon and spread out to
other countries in Europe and other parts of the globe via French soldiers. Italy, Poland,
West Germany, part of Africa, Indochina, Oceania, Portugal, and Spain were influenced
by French civil law, which, in turn, impacted the South American countries colonized by
Spain and Portugal. German law code was developed later and has influenced countries
in Europe and Asia. Some of the countries influenced by German law code are Austria,
Czechoslovakia, Greece, Hungary, Switzerland, Yugoslavia, Japan, and Korea. The third
family, the Scandinavian, is not as close to Roman law as are the other two families, and
the four Nordic countries use this law with some national variations.
England’s laws and the laws of those countries influenced by English law are part
of common-law, which is developed by judges through the resolution of particular
disputes. These laws moved to the British colonies such as the U.S., Canada, Australia,
India, and other countries. Study shows that dissimilarity in legal origin is the reason for

83

differences in laws across countries (La Porta et al. 1998). La Porta et al. (1998) also find
evidence that investors’ legal rights are fewer in civil-law countries, and investors in
common-law counties enjoy the highest level of protection. Also, regulations are better
enforced in the common-law countries than in civil (code)-law counties.
Pagano et al. (1998) argue that only a few very large companies go public in
Europe. The authors suggest that minority property rights are not protected in most
European countries and, therefore, young and small firms are not able to attract investors.
La Porta et al. (1997) argue that countries differ in their legal systems protection of
investors, and they also enforce their rules and laws differently. They put countries into
four categories, based on the origin of their legal systems. The first category includes
countries that follow English law (common law1) which is created by judges. The other
three categories are countries that follow French, Germany, or Scandinavians laws (civil
law), which are created by scholars and legislators. La Porta et al. (1997) compare the
legal rules and enforcement of 49 countries and find that stricter investor-protection rules
are in place and better enforced in countries that follow common laws, and as a result,
both shareholders and creditors are better protected in these countries. They also find that
investors in French civil law countries have the lowest protection and quality of legal
rules, and the levels of enforcement of rules in German civil law and Scandinavian civil
law countries are in the middle.

1

The background on legal systems are similar to previous studies (i.e., La Porta et al. 1997,
1998; Hung 2001)
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La Porta et al. (1997) also find that companies located in common-law countries
have better external-financing resources, and common-law countries have, on average,
three times more outsider stockholders than French-civil-law countries. They conclude
that legal rules and the enforcement of those rules play important roles in the capital
market of a country. Mahoney (2001) finds evidence that the economy in common-law
countries grows faster than in civil-law countries.
Leuz et al. (2003) examine the level of earnings management in companies from
31 countries around the world between 1990 and 1999 and find negative association
between earnings management and the quality of both legal enforcement and minority
shareholders’ rights. High-quality legal systems protect outsiders, investors, by reducing
the ability of the insiders, management, to misuse inside information for their own
benefit. Strong investor protection makes sure that contract terms are followed and
management is disciplined when needed. Leuz et al. (2003) measure the outside-investor
protection by looking at minority-shareholders rights and the quality of the country’s
legal system.
Managers are generally against regulations that may reduce their freedom in
selecting accounting alternatives or require them to provide more information to the
public (Hunton et al. 2006). In code-law countries, firms are allowed to utilize alternative
methods of accounting; therefore, managers have more opportunities to manipulate the
earnings, and this suggests that the probability of earnings-smoothing is higher in codelaw countries (Bartov et al. 2008).
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La Porta et al. (1998) examine the quality of regulations protecting shareholders’
rights and the laws that enforce those regulations. They find that common-law countries
have stronger rules for protecting investors and are better able to enforce their
regulations. Leuz et al. (2003) show a lower frequency of earnings manipulation in
countries in which investor protection is strong.
Other studies provide evidence that the convergence of U.S. GAAP with IFRS
improves the comparability of financial reports; nevertheless, a strong and effective legal
system is necessary for this convergence to have positive results (Bradshow and Miller
2007). However, Street and Gray (2001) find that for some Western European countries
such as Germany and France, compliance with IAS is lower.
In this section, I investigate the association between investor protection and
earnings management measured by beating or meeting analysts’ forecasts for companies
that follow IFRS and are engaged in securitization transactions. Therefore, I investigate
the association between securitization gain and earnings management for companies that
operate in different countries with different legal systems and different investor
protection. I use meeting or beating analysts’ forecasts as a proxy for earnings
management. Therefore, I hypothesize that:
H2: Meeting or beating analysts’ forecasts for companies that use securitization
transactions is lower in countries with stronger investor protection.
III. DATA COLLECTION AND METHODOLOGY
This section discusses the data collection and the methodology used in this study.
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Data Collection
I used LexisNexis and several keywords to find companies in the U.S. and in the
world that have used securitization transactions during the periods 2005-2006 and 20082010 and have almost all of the related data. I have come up with a total of 355 companyyear observations for 71 companies that follow the U.S. GAAP, and a total of 205
company-year observations for 41 companies that follow IFRS. Dechow et al. (2010)
made a similar study in the period between 2000 and 2005 and collected a total of 96
companies. Given that the amount of securitization activities has declined significantly
since the 2000-2005 period, I believe the chance that I have missed any company that is
engaged in securitization activities and is not on my list is extremely low. Finding
information for non-U.S. companies has been extremely hard and time-consuming. The
companies for which I was able to collect data disclose information using different
terminology. I had to use “securitization”, “securitisation”, “financial asset”, “loan and
receivable”, and many more keywords to find firms’ information about financial and
securitization activities. Some accounting systems do not explicitly require the disclosure
of all activities and information. LexisNexis and Google Finance were my main sources
of data collection for IFRS companies. The remaining data were collected using: a) the
Research Insights (COMPUSTAT) database to collect financial data, b) the CRSP
database to collect daily and monthly stock returns and stock prices, c) the SEC’s Edgar
database to look at the firms’ 10-K reports, and d) the Database of the Institutional
Brokers’ Estimate System (I/B/E/S) to collect analysts’ earnings and returns forecasts.

87

My study consists of 355 company-year observation for a total of 71 U.S. companies and
205 company-year observations for a total of 41 IFRS companies.
Methodology
Value Relevance:
In this section I examine the effects of securitization gain on market value of
stocks for companies that are engaged in securitization transactions and follow the U.S.
GAAP. Examining this issue is important because securitization is a method of financing,
and securitization gain is an addition to the earnings. In this study, I examine the valuerelevance of an accounting performance measure, return on equity, for companies that
follow U.S. GAAP and are engaged in securitization transactions.
I collected both price and the number of shares outstanding from the CRSP
database. I used the following model to test the first hypothesis of this dissertation.

MKT_VALit = β0 + β1SEC-GAINit + β2 ROEit + β3SEC-ROEit + β4ROE_LAGit
Β5SIZEit + β6LVRGit + β7LIQUIDITYit + β8SEGit + εit
… (3-1)
Where:
MKT_VALit: Market value of the equity at the end of the period scaled by total assets for
firm i in year t
SEC-GAINit: Gain from securitization scaled by total equity for firm i in year t
ROEit: Return on equity as a proxy for accounting performance for firm i in year t
SEC-ROEit: Interaction variable between SEC-GAIN and ROE for firm i in year t
SIZEit: Natural log of total assets which is used as a risk proxy for firm i in year t
LVRGit: Total liability scaled by total assets for firm i in year t
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LIQUIDITYit: Total cash and cash equivalent scaled by total assets for firm i in year t
SEGit: Number of operating segments for firm i in year t
Proxies for Investor Protection:
It is well established by prior studies that investors are better protected in
common-law countries (La Porta et al. 1996, 1998; Johnson et al. 2000; Glaezer et al.
2001). Therefore, I use two proxies for investor protection which have been used in prior
studies (e.g., Hung 2001). The first proxy for investor protection is the legal system,
grouping countries into common-law and code-law. As did La Porta et al. (1997), I use
Reynolds and Flores (1989) to categorize countries into legal families (common/code).
Investing in a company entitles the shareholder to voting rights, choosing
directors and participating in critical corporation decision-making. Therefore, countries
with higher-quality regulations and stronger law enforcement grant investors more power
to exercise their rights. La Porta et al. (1996) show that strong anti-director rights highly
encourage outside investors to participate in the market and discourage opportunism by
managers. Consequently, the second proxy for investor protection is the anti-director
rights index (ANTI) developed by La Porta et al. (1998) and employed by Hung (2001).
This index is based on answers to the following five questions. Each country starts with
zero points and gains one point when the country’s action supports shareholders:
1- One point if country’s rules allow stockholders to vote via mail, and zero points if
stockholders must vote in person.
2- One point if shareholders are not required to deposit their shares before shareholder
meeting and zero points otherwise.
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3- One point if the country permits cumulative voting for directors and zero points
otherwise.
4- One point when a shareholder with less than 5% of share capital is entitled to call for
an extraordinary shareholder meeting. (Minority shareholders have more difficulty
calling the meeting when the benchmark percentage is higher.)
5- One point for countries that allow the minority shareholders to take legal action
against the directors.
Earnings Management:
In this section, I investigate earnings management through securitization under different
levels of investor protection. Therefore, I use the following model to test my second
hypothesis.

SEC-GAINit =β0 + β1MEETit+ β2 PRESEC-EARit+ β3MEET-ANTIit+ β4MEETLEGALit + β5 ANTIit + β6 ANTIit + β7LIQUIDITYit + β8SIZEit + β9ROAit + εit
… (3-2)

Where:
SEC-GAINit: Gain from securitization obtained from company’s 10-K filing with the
SEC for firm i in year t
MEETit: Equal to one when there is non-negative earnings surprise and zero otherwise
for firm i in year t
PRESEC-EARit: Pre-securitization earnings for firm i in year t
LEGALit: A dummy variable for legal system for firm i in year t
ANTIit: Anti-director index for firm i in year t
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MEET-ANTIit: Interaction between MEET and ANTI for firm i in year t
MEET-LEGALit: Interaction between MEET and LEGAL for firm i in year t
LVRGit: Total liability scaled by total assets for firm i in year t
LIQUIDITYit: Total cash and cash equivalent scaled by total assets for firm i in year t
SIZEit: Natural log of total assets which is a used as risk proxy for firm i in year t
ROAit: Return on assets for firm i in year t
IV. RESULTS
Previously in this dissertation, I found evidence of earnings management during
2005-2006 for U.S. companies. In this section, I examine whether the securitization gain
also reduces the value-relevance of an accounting measure, return on equity, in the U.S.
market. Table 4-1 shows descriptive statistics for 355 company-year observations for 71
companies that follow U.S. GAAP, covering all three periods (2005-2006; 2008-2009;
2010). Using the residual analysis, all outliers are detected and removed from the
regression analysis.
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Table 4-1
Descriptive Statistics for Paper Three (companies following U.S. GAAP)
(Year 2007 is the crises year and is excluded from the analyses)
Panel A: 2005-2006
th

th

Variable

Obs

Mean

Std. Dev.

25 %tile

Median

75 %tile

Min

Max

MKT_VALit

126

818.8264

1686.832

163.4584

361.2205

823.1911

.0313843

1506.515

SEC-GAINit

142

0.009612

0.073007

0

8.45E-07

0.000241

0.000000

0.830171

ROEit

142

2.944484

16.93579

0.00002

0.01347

0.035977

-59.70085

159.9353

SIZEit

126

9.229762

2.565112

7.5475

8.965

10.78

1.97

14.45

MK-BKit

126

0.519636

3.438531

0.000012

0.001942

0.011179

-0.0000005

37.19008

LVRGit

126

0.819813

0.669085

0.5963228

0.822354

0.913319

0.0786421

6.530481

LIQUIDITYit

126

0.087852

0.339538

0.010277

0.023938

0.055699

0.0000000

3.570135

SEGit

142

2.732394

2.126881

1

2

4

1

10

Panel B: 2008-2009
th

Variable

Obs

Mean

MKT_VALit

124

615.7134

SEC-GAINit

142

0.018526

ROEit

142

SIZEit

Std. Dev.

25 %tile

1053.511

th

Median

75 %tile

Min

Max

53.40761

206.7493

627.2644

.0238447

1694.786

0.093198

0

0.000205

0.010217

0.00000

0.490933

3.42803

46.15863

-0.000057

0.000752

0.013441

-167.565

495.8103

124

9.244106

2.669727

7.290797

8.966519

11.0027

3.619851

14.6145

MK-BKit

124

0.005761

0.008458

0.0000143

0.001944

0.009363

-8.5E-05

0.05015

LVRGit

124

0.729326

0.269558

0.564727

0.832823

0.90164

0.005402

1.737622

LIQUIDITYit

124

0.079873

0.206706

0.012406

0.026796

0.073368

0.000000

2.031702

SEGit

142

2.669014

1.991905

1

2

4

1

10

Panel C: 2010
th

Variable

Obs

Mean

Std. Dev.

25 %tile

th

Median

75 %tile

Min

Max

MKT_VALit

71

571.3472

794.7417

84.91694

249.8426

791.5049

12.765

1661.338

SEC-GAINit

71

0.006407

0.025225

0

0.000014

0.000310

0.000000

0.170963

ROEit

71

7.45221

18.24313

0

0.018942

6.056313

-0.82136

96.4404

SIZEit

59

9.330365

2.721738

7.408278

9.15173

11.06695

3.633922

14.63305

LVRGit

59

0.775497

0.458612

0.587750

0.823102

0.889623

0.156986

3.814057

SEGit

71

2.746479

2.08202

1

2

4

1

10
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Where:
MKT_VALit: Market value of the equity at the end of the period scaled by total assets for firm i in year t
SEC-GAINit: Gain from securitization scaled by total equity for firm i in year t
ROEit: Return on equity as a proxy for accounting performance for firm i in year t
SIZEit: Natural log of total assets which is used as a risk proxy for firm i in year t
LVRGit: Total liability scaled by total assets for firm i in year t
LIQUIDITYit: Total cash and cash equivalent scaled by total assets for firm i in year t
SEGit: Number of operating segments for firm i in year t

The LIQUIDITY variable is dropped in 2010 because of its small number of
observations.
Table 4-2 contains the correlation matrices for the three periods of this study. No
problematic correlation among independent variables is observed except for MK-BK,
which is dropped from regression analyses. Just as with my detailed explanations in the
earlier section, the results do not show any sign of multicollinearity.

Table 4-2
Correlation Matrices for Paper Three (companies following U.S. GAAP)
Panel A: 2005-2006
SEC-GAINit

ROEit

SIZEit

MK-BKit

LVRGit

LIQUIDITYit

SEC-GAINit

1

ROEit

0.1794**

1

SIZEit

0.0667

0.1378

1

MK-BKit

0.1156

0.379***

0.219

1

LVRGit

0.0214

0.0009

-0.1457

0.0195

1

LIQUIDITYit

-0.0738

-0.0174

-0.2447***

-0.0271

-0.062

1

SEGit

0.2734***

0.0955

0.2137**

0.1846**

0.1181

0.0087
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Table 4-2
Correlation Matrices for Paper Three (Continued)
Panel B: 2008-2009
SEC-GAINit
SEC-GAINit

ROEit

SIZEit

MK-BKit

LVRGit

LIQUIDITYit

1

ROEit

0.2301***

1

SIZEit

0.0958

0.0556

1

MK-BKit

0.1867

0.0504

0.6863***

1

LVRGit

0.1137

0.0787

0.5142***

0.4087***

1

LIQUIDITYit

-0.0383

-0.05

-0.1957**

-0.1168

-0.2876***

1

SEGit

-0.0298

-0.073

0.180**3

0.1531*

0.0117

0.06

MK-BKit

LVRGit

Panel C: 2010
SEC-GAINit

ROEit

SIZEit

SEC-GAINit

1

ROEit

-0.0823

1

SIZEit

0.0039

0.2339***

1

MK-BKit

0.3743

0.007

0.7382***

1

LVRGit

-0.0454

-0.0077

0.05

0.3805

1

LIQUIDITYit

0.0912

-0.0322

0.1816

-0.3365

0.0587

Where:
SEC-GAINit: Gain from securitization scaled by total equity for firm i in year t
ROEit: Return on equity as a proxy for accounting performance for firm i in year t
SIZEit: Natural log of total assets which is used as a risk proxy for firm i in year t
LVRGit: Total liability scaled by total assets for firm i in year t
LIQUIDITYit: Total cash and cash equivalent scaled by total assets for firm i in year t
SEGit: Number of operating segments for firm i in year t

The results of multivariate panel data regression for the first two periods, as well
as the results for cross sectional model of the last period, are presented in Table 4-3. As
the results show, the coefficient of ROE as well as the coefficient of interaction between
ROE and securitization gain is not significant, indicating the lack of value-relevance for
securitization gain. This finding is not consistent with the finding by Niu and Richardson
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(2006), who conclude that securitization gains receive lower value by market. This
finding does not support my second hypothesis for any period. The results also show that
the coefficient of leverage is not significant in the period before the financial crisis year
(2005-2006), indicating that investors have not penalized companies for their leverage
before 2007. However, the coefficient of leverage is highly significant and negative after
the crisis year (2008-2009 and 2010), indicating that the investors have become more
sensitive about the companies borrowing after the crisis year and penalized them for their
reported debt.
Table 4-3
Regression Results for Paper Three (companies following U.S. GAAP)

MKT_VALit = β0 + β1SEC-GAINit + β2 ROEit + β3SEC-ROEit + β4ROE_LAGit
Β5SIZEit + β6LVRGit + β7LIQUIDITYit + β8SEGit + εit
2005-2006
z-value

2008-2009
P>|z|

z-value

2010
P>|z|

t-value

P>|t|

MKT_VALit

Coef

SEC-GAINit

-1852.75

-0.37

0.711

-783.7502

-0.6

0.551

4257.369

1.05

0.301

ROEit

0.323248

0.03

0.979

-1.640679

-0.8

0.425

4.087757

0.56

0.582

SEC-ROEit

34.71619

0.28

0.78

593.3049

1.05

0.293

246.9704

0.23

0.819

ROE_LAGit

6.313194

0.4

0.687

-1.973393

-0.8

0.422

3.719184

0.57

0.571

SIZEit

-511.72***

-2.9

0.004

-158.9867

-0.2

0.841

48.37349

1.09

0.285

LVRGit

-142.538

-0.32

0.748

-253.997***

-3.79

0.000

-3725.28***

-7.78

0.000

LIQUIDITYit

-1093.76***

-3.37

0.001

-323.0681

-0.1

0.92

-41.69201

-1.18

0.245

SEGit

5.785015

0.04

0.968

-1.710824

-0.04

0.967

42.57369

1.05

0.301
0.000

_cons

6298.86***

3.61

0.000

3297.86***

5.05

0.000

3243.4***

8.36

Adj. rsquared:

0.4482***

Coef

0.5259***

Coef

0.5788***

(Significance at the levels of 10%, 5%, and 1% are indicated by *, **, and ***)
Where:
MKT_VALit: Market value of the equity at the end of the period scaled by total assets for firm i in year t
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SEC-GAINit: Gain from securitization scaled by total equity for firm i in year t
ROEit: Return on equity as a proxy for accounting performance for firm i in year t
SEC-ROEit: Interaction variable between SEC-GAIN and ROE for firm i in year t
ROE_LAGit : Lag of Return on Equity for firm i in year t
SIZEit: Natural log of total assets which is used as a risk proxy for firm i in year t
LVRGit: Total liability scaled by total assets for firm i in year t
LIQUIDITYit: Total cash and cash equivalent scaled by total assets for firm i in year t
SEGit: Number of operating segments for firm i in year t

I have adopted information from prior research to create Table 4-4, which consists
of two proxies for investor protection (La Porta et al. 1996, 1998; Hung 2001). Legal
system (LEGL) represents the legal system of the country, which is equal to one if the
country has common-law system and zero if the country follows code-law system. Antidirector index was created by La Porta (1996) and used in many studies. The index is
ranged from zero to five and calculated based on the answers to 5 specific questions
listed on La Porta et al. (1998).

Table 4-4
Anti-director index and Legal system
Country

Legal system

Anti-director Index

Australia

1

4

France

0

2

Germany

0

1

Ireland

1

3

Netherland

0

2

Spain

0

2

Switzerland

0

1

U.K.

1

4
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Table 4-5 represents descriptive statistics for companies that follow IFRS for the three
periods of this study. I scaled the securitization gain (SEC-GAIN) and net income before
securitization gain (PRESEC-EAR) by total stockholders’ equity. Using the residual
analysis, all outliers are detected and removed from the regression analysis. In the
residual analysis, I ran the original model and calculated the residual-squared, then
plotted the residual-squared against each independent variable to find outliers.

Table 4-5
Descriptive Statistics for Paper Three (companies following IFRS)
(Year 2007 is the crises year and is excluded from the analyses)
Panel A: 2005-2006
Variable

Obs

Mean

th

Std. Dev.

25 %tile

th

Median

75 %tile

Min

Max

SEC-GAINit

74

0.022002

0.106325

0

0.0019531

0.0128746

0.00000

0.910598

MEETit

80

0.5375

0.501738

0

1

1

0

1

PRESEC-EARit

74

0.304472

1.23783

0.028681

0.111829

0.175138

-0.62813

10.4709

ANTIit

80

3.075

1.133774

2

3

4

1

5

LEGALit

80

0.525

0.502525

0

1

1

0

1

LVRGit

74

0.777839

0.298365

0.680637

0.934777

0.957328

0.00000

0.993505

LIQUIDITYit

74

0.048623

0.069203

0.006096

0.021289

0.0621536

0.000593

0.282788

SIZEit

74

18.20715

3.317118

15.32291

18.73759

20.02763

12.50103

26.1

ROAit

74

5.204459

16.76111

0.4675

1.05

2.3075

-2.6

100
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Table 4-5
Descriptive Statistics for Paper Three (Continued)
Panel B: 2008-2009
th

th

Variable

Obs

Mean

Std. Dev.

25 %tile

Median

75 %tile

Min

Max

SEC-GAINit

78

0.030455

0.179768

0

0.000206

0.017976

0.00000

0.551792

MEETit

80

0.3625

0.483755

0

0

1

0

1

PRESEC-EARit

78

0.010979

0.212082

-0.0285631

0.0004471

0.088587

-0.51548

0.770801

ANTIit

80

3.075

1.133774

2

3

4

1

5

LEGALit

80

0.525

0.502525

0

1

1

0

1

LVRGit

78

0.809409

0.274231

0.8001556

0.9369088

0.9534939

0

1.003593

LIQUIDITYit

78

0.046706

0.050908

0.0108583

0.0320459

0.0604727

0.000001

0.24

SIZEit

78

18.65359

3.283764

16.70366

19.36101

20.29982

12.16645

26.4

ROAit

78

2.107692

17.68556

-0.1725

0.435

0.99

-44.38

100

Obs

Mean

Std. Dev.

25 %tile

Median

75 %tile

Min

Max

Panel C: 2010
Variable

th

th

SEC-GAINit

38

0.018478

0.140588

0

0.0005991

0.0145284

0.0000

0.443686

MEETit

39

0.48718

0.50637

0

0

1

0

1

PRESEC-EARit

38

0.011042

0.283357

-0.0028831

0.0222797

0.0741762

-1.18472

0.957723

ANTIit

40

3.075

1.141018

2

3

4

1

5

LEGALit

40

0.525

0.505736

0

1

1

0

1

LVRGit

38

0.815693

0.252192

0.8068669

0.9330751

0.9540754

0.002057

0.99725

LIQUIDITYit

38

0.044301

0.047555

0.0145737

0.0342155

0.0642847

0.000417

0.251354

SIZEit

38

18.67024

3.353848

16.52661

19.17263

20.81655

12.23658

26.4

ROAit

38

3.172368

16.82162

0.11

0.825

2.0175

-22.1

100

Where:
SEC-GAINit: Gain from securitization obtained from company’s 10-K filing with the SEC for firm i in year
t
MEETit: Equal to one when there is non-negative earnings surprise and zero otherwise for firm i in year t
PRESEC-EARit: Pre-securitization earnings for firm i in year t
ANTIit: Anti-director index for firm i in year t
LEGALit: A dummy variable for legal system for firm i in year t
LVRGit: Total liability scaled by total assets for firm i in year t
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LIQUIDITYit: Total cash and cash equivalent scaled by total assets for firm i in year t
SIZEit: Natural log of total assets which is a used as risk proxy for firm i in year t
ROAit: Return on assets for firm i in year t

Table 4-6 presents correlation matrices for companies in all three time periods. As
this table shows, there are a few significant correlations among variables; however, none
of them is higher than .7, except for LEGAL and ROA variables. The LEGAL variable is
dropped from the analyses of all three periods, and the ROA is dropped from the first
period analysis. The common rule of thumb for identifying multicollinearity is a variance
inflation factor (VIF) of 10 or more, or a tolerance of 0.1 or less. Another way is to
examine the bivariate correlations between independent variables and look for correlation
of 0.7 or higher. Lastly, muticollinearity may be present when the overall model is
significant but none of the independent variables are significant. After dropping variables
that show a high bivariate correlation, my analysis does not show any of the above
symptoms.

Table 4-6
Correlation Matrices for Paper Three (companies following IFRS)
Panel A: 2005-2006
MEETit

PRESEC-EARit

ANTIit

LEGALit

LVRGit

LIQUIDITYit

SIZEit

MEETit

1

PRESEC-EARit

0.0948

1

ANTIit

0.1953*

0.1858

1

LEGALit

0.1719

0.0974

0.8187***

1

LVRGit

0.0723

0.0795

-0.1223

-0.0479

1

LIQUIDITYit

-0.0865

0.3455**

-0.0488

-0.0568

-0.2443**

1

SIZEit

-0.0089

-0.1631

-0.2525**

-0.3867***

0.3267***

-0.3172***

1

ROAit

0.084

0.6273***

0.3587***

0.2081*

-0.1236

0.6232***

-0.2676**
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Table 4-6
Correlation Matrices for Paper Three (Continued)
Panel B: 2008-2009
MEETit

PRESEC-EARit

ANTIit

LEGALit

LVRGit

LIQUIDITYit

SIZEit

MEETit

1

PRESEC-EARit

-0.0031

1

ANTIit

0.1575

-0.1042

1

LEGALit

0.1966*

-0.0162

0.8187***

1

LVRGit

-0.0451

-0.04

-0.1988*

-0.1483

1

LIQUIDITYit

-0.1677

0.0626

-0.2343**

-0.2199

-0.2005*

1

SIZEit

-0.097

-0.1637

-0.1995*

-0.3747***

0.4181***

-0.08

1

ROAit

0.1394

-0.0899

0.3176***

0.1853

0.0313

-0.166

-0.037

Panel C: 2010
PRESEC-EARit
MEETit

ANTIit

LEGALit

LVRGit

LIQUIDITYit

SIZEit

MEETit

1

PRESEC-EARit

0.1059

1

ANTIit

0.3389**

0.3165**

1

LEGALit

0.285*

0.1727

0.8187***

1

LVRGit

-0.1016

-0.2213

-0.2048

-0.2967*

1

LIQUIDITYit

-0.1105

0.1027

-0.0231

-0.0592

-0.3182*

1

SIZEit

0.0156

-0.1003

-0.1799

-0.3587**

0.446***

-0.1081

1

ROAit

0.1925

0.1121

0.3308**

0.2188

0.0065

-0.1718

-0.1188

Where:
MEETit: Equal to one when there is non-negative earnings surprise and zero otherwise for firm i in year t
PRESEC-EARit: Pre-securitization earnings for firm i in year t
ANTIit: Anti-director index for firm i in year t
LEGALit: A dummy variable for legal system for firm i in year t
LVRGit: Total liability scaled by total assets for firm i in year t
LIQUIDITYit: Total cash and cash equivalent scaled by total assets for firm i in year t
SIZEit: Natural log of total assets which is a used as risk proxy for firm i in year t
ROAit: Return on assets for firm i in year t

To investigate the association between investor protection and earnings management
using securitization, I use a multivariate-panel data regression to test for the first two
periods and a cross sectional regression for the last one. The results are presented in
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Table 4-7. The results show that the coefficients of interaction between MEET and
LEGAL and the interaction between MEET and ANTI are not significant, indicating that
companies that are engaged in securitization transactions and operate under IFRS
experience, on average, no earnings management. This finding does not support the first
hypothesis of this paper. The explanation I can suggest is that IFRS regulations are
intense enough with regard to securitization to reduce the extent of manipulation of
financial statements under any type of investor protection. The results also show that, in
the first two periods, companies that operate under strong anti-director laws experience
higher securitization gain. Finally, the results show that, in the second and third period,
the model has higher explanatory power compared to the first period. The difference can
be as a result of more predictability of variables in the last two periods.
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Table 4-7
Regression Results for Paper Three (companies following IFRS)

SEC-GAINit =β0 + β1MEETit+ β2 PRESEC-EARit+ β3MEET-ANTIit+ β4MEETLEGALit + β5 ANTIit + β6 ANTIit + β7LIQUIDITYit + β8SIZEit + β9ROAit + εit
2005-2006

2008-2009

z-value

P>|z|

0.1190683

1.47

0.141

PRESEC-EARit

-0.0029717

-0.27

MEET-ANTIit

-0.0485189

MEET-LEGALit

2010

z-value

P>|z|

t-value

P>|t|

0.0941344

1.01

0.314

0.57

0.574

0.789

-0.476460***

-7.07

0.000

-5.48

0.000

-1.56

0.119

-0.0189002

-0.45

0.653

-0.015361

-0.26

0.795

0.0015855

0.03

0.98

0.0543293

0.54

0.589

0.0246164

0.23

0.823

ANTIit

0.040972***

2.57

0.01

0.0496596***

2.65

0.008

0.0170804

0.75

0.46

LVRGit

-0.0769156

-1.68

0.092

-0.0584866

-0.93

0.354

0.0231975

0.28

0.784

LIQUIDITYit

0.0100235

0.05

0.961

0.482642

1.46

0.143

0.0076937

0.02

0.986

SIZEit

-0.0000917

-0.02

0.984

-0.0036641

-0.64

0.522

-0.0019458

-0.3

0.766

ROAit

-

-

-

-0.0007621

-0.78

0.437

-0.0008318

-0.66

0.517

_cons

-0.021758

-0.21

0.836

-0.0460575

-0.35

0.726

-0.0350959

-0.26

0.798

Adj. r-squared:

0.1733 *

SEC-GAINit

Coef

MEETit

Coef

0.5836 ***

Coef
0.086019
-0.38359***

0.4492***

(Significance at the levels of 10%, 5%, and 1% are indicated by *, **, and ***)
Where:
SEC-GAINit: Gain from securitization obtained from company’s 10-K filing with the SEC for firm i in year
t
MEETit: Equal to one when there is non-negative earnings surprise and zero otherwise for firm i in year t
PRESEC-EARit: Pre-securitization earnings for firm i in year t
LEGALit: A dummy variable for legal system for firm i in year t
ANTIit: Anti-director index for firm i in year t
MEET-ANTIit: Interaction between MEET and ANTI for firm i in year t
MEET-LEGALit: Interaction between MEET and LEGAL for firm i in year t
LVRGit: Total liability scaled by total assets for firm i in year t
LIQUIDITYit: Total cash and cash equivalent scaled by total assets for firm i in year t
SIZEit: Natural log of total assets which is a used as risk proxy for firm i in year t
ROAit: Return on assets for firm i in year t
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V. CONCLUSIONS
In this dissertation, I first used U.S. companies and examined the value-relevance
of an accounting performance measure, return on equity, for companies engaged in
securitization transactions. I selected companies from three time periods to capture
changes in the economy and regulations. My finding does not show any value-relevance
for securitization gain in any of the three time periods (2005-2006, 2008-2009, 2010).
This finding does not support my second hypothesis in any period and is not consistent
with the finding of prior studies (e.g., Niu and Richardson 2006) which shows that
investors believe that the value-relevance of earnings is higher when securitization gain is
not included in earnings. The possible explanation for the lack of value-relevance of
securitization gain in the period before the crisis is the complexity of calculation and the
unfamiliarity of investors with the securitization process, as well as the existence of
extensive varieties of securitized assets. After the crisis year, investors became more
knowledgeable with the securitization process; however, the securitization activities have
decreased greatly and lost their significance.
Then I use IFRS companies and test whether the possibility of earnings
management using securitization transactions among companies that operate under
different legal systems and anti-director laws is reduced. I collected data from three time
periods to capture changes in the economy and regulations. My findings indicate that
companies that are engaged in securitization transactions and operate under IFRS, on
average, experience no earnings management. This finding does not support the first
hypothesis of this dissertation. My interpretation is that IFRS regulations regarding
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securitization are intense enough to reduce the extent of manipulation of financial
statements under any type of investor protection.
My findings also show that, in the first two periods, companies that operated
under strong anti-director laws experienced higher securitization gain. However, the
results do not show any sign of earnings management (no significant association between
securitization gain and meet or beat analysts’ forecasts). This indicates that the
securitization gain under strong anti-director laws did not result from earnings
management even though I find strong negative association between proxy for managers’
incentive for earnings management (income before securitization gain) and securitization
gain for the last two periods. Finally, the findings indicate that in the second and third
periods, the model has higher explanatory power compared to the first period. The
difference can be a result of more predictability of variables in the last two periods.
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CHAPTER V
RESULTS, CONTRIBUTIONS, AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS
I. DISCUSSIONS
Securitization is a popular financing tool through which the seller of financial
assets (e.g. receivables/loans) can create cash and transfer the risk of holding receivables
to another party. Depending on how securitization is constructed, it can affect the
financial reports. If the transaction meets the criteria for sales, set by standard-setters
(IFRS/FASB), the asset is removed from the balance sheet, and the difference between
the sale’s proceeds and book value is recognized as gain/lose. However, if the criteria for
sales are not met, then the asset stays on the balance sheet, and liabilities increase by the
amount of cash received.
Even though securitization became a popular financing activity over a short
period of time and by one quarter of 2007 around nine trillion dollars in asset-backed
securities were outstanding, most American were not familiar with the complexity
involved in the securitization process. Therefore, the financial crisis, the fall of large
banks, and the bailout shocked Americans hard. Thus, studying the complexities related
to the securitization process and researching accounting standards that may reduce the
problems is critical.
Prior studies suggest that managers can take advantage of the flexibility of
accounting standards (e.g. fair-value accounting) and manage earnings using
securitization process. Before the SFAS 166 in 2009, managers had no difficulty in
constructing securitization transactions to meet the criteria for sales accounting under
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Statement no. 140, even when the transferor of the asset retained partial interest in the
securitized asset. Prior research claims that managers used desirable discount rates to
show higher gains when they estimated the fair value of retained interests.
In this dissertation, I use different time frames than those used in prior studies,
and I also include companies that follow IFRS (prior studies only used U.S. companies)
to investigate the claim made by previous researchers. I included the periods before and
after financial crises to investigate the impact of changes in market conditions and new
regulations. Moreover, I included IFRS companies in my study to determine whether
managers following IFRS have the same attitudes as managers of companies that follow
U.S. GAPP because over the last few years, the biggest concern of standard-setters
around the world has been the convergence with IFRS.
In addition, I investigated whether the companies’ securitization gain is the result
of their special competitive advantage of some unique abilities/resources or earnings
management. Another issue which I tested is the possibility of earnings management
using securitization under different levels of investor protection, and whether the
securitization activities decrease the value-relevance of accounting numbers.
II. RESULTS
My overall results for companies following U.S. GAAP indicate that there is
evidence of earnings management for the period 2005-2006 (before the financial crisis);
however, I do not find any indication that the discount rate being used shows higher
securitization gain. My results also show that there is a significant association between
meeting/beating earnings forecast and securitization gain during the period before the
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crisis. However, there is no positive relationship between securitization gain and
competitive advantage for any time period. Also, there is no indication of earnings
management for the period of 2008-2010. It is argued that companies have become more
conservative after the issuance of SFAS 166.
My findings also indicate that companies that are engaged in securitization
transactions and operate under IFRS, on average, experience no earnings management.
My interpretation is that the IFRS regulations regarding securitization transactions are
restrictive enough to reduce the extent of manipulation of financial statements under any
type of investor protection. Furthermore, my findings show that in the first two periods,
companies operating under strong anti-director laws experienced higher securitization
gain. Therefore, I can argue that the securitization gain is not as a result of earnings
management.
Lastly, my findings indicate a lack of value-relevance of return on equity for
companies that follow U.S. GAAP. This finding does not support my second hypothesis
in any period, and is not consistent with the finding of prior studies (e.g., Niu and
Richardson 2006) which show that investors believe the value-relevance of earnings is
higher when securitization gain is not included in earnings.
III. CONTRIBUTIONS
My dissertation is expected to make several contributions. First, I find evidence of
earnings manipulation for the period before the crisis for companies that follow U.S.
GAAP. However, lack of association between a discount rate used for estimating fair
value of retained interest and securitization gain shows that fair-value accounting is not
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responsible for earnings management. This result sheds light on the controversy about
fair-value accounting in relation with securitization.
Second, I did not find any sign of earnings management using securitization for
any time period under IFRS, so I conclude that IFRS provides higher-quality accounting
policies for securitization, at least compared to SFAS 140. In addition, it is true that the
result shows no earnings management during 2008 to 2010, but I cannot relate this result
to the new standard (SFAS 166) because only the financial statement of the period 2010
was affected by the new standard. Therefore, I conclude that convergence with IFRS in
relation to accounting for securitization will benefit the U.S. market.
I have not found earnings management for companies that follow IFRS under any
level of investor protection. This finding is further evidence to support the idea of
convergence with IFRS. In addition, my results show that the companies’ competitive
advantage is not responsible for generating securitization gain by companies that follow
the U.S. GAAP. Finally, in the last part of the dissertation, I show the impact of
securitization activities on the value-relevance of accounting performance measures. I
find no value-relevance for ROE as a measure of accounting performance. To the best of
my knowledge, these issues are not investigated or addressed in prior studies.
The policy implication of my findings is to support the convergence of the U.S.
GAAP and IFRS with respect to securitization. Policy-makers and standard-setters can
take into account the findings of my study in their decision process. My findings show
that, after 2006 in the United States on average, there has not been earnings management
through securitization, even though the related regulation was not changed until 2010. It
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appears that the market participants in the securitization transaction have voluntarily
changed their behavior and stopped using securitization to manipulate financial
statements.
IV. LIMITATIONS
The most important limitation of this study has been the data collection for
companies that follow IFRS. Even though currently more than 117 countries require or
allow their registered companies to follow IFRS, not all of them have adopted IFRS at the
same time. This created difficulties findings companies that adopted the IFRS, have
securitization activities, and have complete data for five years. Another reason for having
small sample is the fact that companies that follow IFRS are operating under different
legal systems and use different languages and terms for their financial reporting.
Furthermore, the economic and financial crises after 2007 have also decreased the
volume of securitization activities. In short, decreased in the level of securitization
activities coupled with unavailability of financial data for companies that follow IFR has
negatively affected my sample size resulting in less power of my tests.
The one-year observations in 2010 have been another limitation of this study,
which can be removed in the future when more time-series data will be available.
Another important caveat is that the securitization is a useful vehicle and source of
liquidity for most financial institutions, and any excessive restriction on securitization can
contribute to market inefficiencies and must be avoided. To come up with an optimal
level of restriction on securitization, academicians and scholars are encouraged to
allocate more resources and put more efforts in this area of research.
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In my study, I have used the anti-director index that has been used in the literature
since 1996. Another index has recently been developed by La Porta that can be used in
future related studies. The calculation of this new index requires a lengthy process
including the completion of a comprehensive survey.
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